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I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

The developed world has made much progress in improving social conditions over the last several centuries. Safe and plentiful food
and water, while once a daily struggle to achieve, are now significantly
1
easier to come by. Technological advancements have made access to
2
medical care more readily available to the masses. Both in Europe
and in the United States, times have changed and societies have responded by innovating with new and beneficial legal constructs. But
no matter how far modern society progresses, there is one social
problem that it seems no society has gotten just right: housing. Almost every major economic player on the globe has faced a selfdescribed housing crisis in the last seventy-five years, and many of
3
these are perceived to continue even today. Although housing crises
may take many forms, they often manifest themselves as shortages of
∗
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1
Recent efforts in global sanitation resulted in a ten percent increase in areas
with access to safe water, giving over 1.2 billion additional persons access to clean water in 2004. See generally UNICEF PROGRESS REPORT: A REPORT CARD OF WATER AND
SAFETY (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/Progress_for_Child
ren_No._5_English.pdf.
2
See THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 6 (1999), available at http://www.who.int/whr/1999/en/whr99_ch1_en.pdf
(attributing more than half of the gains in public health from 1950 to 1992, including declines in infant mortality and disease, to technological advances).
3
See, e.g., VALERIE KARN & HAROLD WOLMAN, COMPARING HOUSING SYSTEMS 143–
44, 148 (1992) (describing housing crises in the United States and United Kingdom).
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available and adequate housing, particularly in the rental market.
Rental housing shortages then lead to a whole host of other societal
5
problems, including, at the extreme end, homelessness.
Public concern over housing issues has reached an all-time high.
Perhaps the most telling recent example comes from the French
struggle to solve its housing problems. In early 2007, a group of protesters referred to as “Les Enfants de Don Quichotte” (“The Children of
Don Quixote”) set up a tent city in one of Paris’ most vibrant areas.
Those involved were protesting the state of the housing market in
6
France. And they were not all homeless. Even some of the social
elite of France came out, albeit temporarily, to support the dream ad7
vocated by Les Enfants. In response to such an undeniable outcry for
action on the housing situation in France, the government detailed a
8
proposal to “create a legal right to housing.” A bill that went before
the French parliament in March, 2007 proposed a legally enforceable
9
guarantee of safe and sanitary housing for all. On March 5, 2007, the
bill passed, making France only the second European country (be10
hind Scotland) to guarantee such a right.

4

Id. at 148.
See Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 315, 321–24 (1990).
6
French PM Vows to Help Homeless, BBC NEWS, Jan. 1, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6227237.stm [hereinafter French PM Vows]; see
also John Ward Anderson, Tent Cities Across France Stake Claims for the Homeless: Chirac
Promises A Right to Housing, But Doubt Remains, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at A22 (noting promise by then-presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy that, if he were elected,
“no homeless people would be on the streets of Paris in two years”).
7
French PM Vows, supra note 6.
8
Law No. 2007-290 of March 5, 2007, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 5, 2007, p. 4190, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires”
hyperlink). The law guarantees the right to “decent and independent” housing to
any permanent French resident if the resident is not able to provide or maintain
such housing by his own means. Id.
9
Id.
10
The Scottish Executive appointed a task force in 1999 to make recommendations on remedying and preventing homelessness. HOMELESSNESS TASK FORCE FINAL
REPORT, HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE: AN ACTION PLAN FOR PREVENTION AND EFFECTIVE
RESPONSE (2002), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library3/society/htff.pdf
[hereinafter HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE]. The task force’s report grew out of the
principle that “everyone in Scotland should have dry, warm, affordable and secure
housing[, which] . . . is . . . crucial to family life, physical and mental health, child
development, employability and the creation of sustainable communities.” Id. at 1.
As a result of the 2002 report, the Executive enacted The Homelessness Act of 2003.
The Homelessness (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 10). The Act extends the right to
housing to all homeless persons. Id.
5
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The French development is an interesting one, particularly in
light of the fact that a multitude of European jurisdictions seem to
sympathize with the sentiment behind it. France may be one of the
only countries to governmentally guarantee housing, but at least nine
European countries have declared it a fundamental right held by all
11
mankind. Even across the Atlantic in the United States, the notion
that adequate housing is a core right is taking hold, though certainly
12
more slowly than it has in Europe.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the French movement is
that, if the government guarantees housing, it must then implement
that plan. How is this guaranteed housing to be provided? Not surprisingly, the French plan provides only scant detail about the vehicle
11

See, e.g., BELG. CONST. art. 23 (“Everyone has the right to lead a life in conformity with human dignity. . . . These rights include notably . . . the right to have decent accommodation . . . .”); FIN. CONST. § 19 (“The public authorities shall promote
the right of everyone to housing and the opportunity to arrange their own housing.”); 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 21 (Greece) (“The provision of homes
to those who are homeless or live in inadequate housing conditions shall be the subject of special care by the State.”); Gw. [Constitution] art. 22 (Neth.) (“It shall be the
concern of the authorities to provide sufficient living accommodation.”); PORT.
CONST. art. 65 (2005) (“Everyone has the right for himself and his family to a dwelling of adequate size satisfying standards of hygiene and comfort and preserving personal and family privacy.”); CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] 47 (Spain) (“All Spaniards have the
right to enjoy decent and adequate housing.”); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF]
[Constitution] 1:2 (Swed.) (“It shall be incumbent upon the public administration to
secure . . . housing and education, and to promote social care and social security and
a good living environment.”); HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 1 (noting
the Scottish view of housing as “crucial to family life”); Law No. 89-462 of July 8,
1989, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
July 8, 1989, p. 8541, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres
textes législatifs et réglementaires” hyperlink); see also Jane Ball, Renting Homes: Status
and Security in the UK and France—A Comparison in the Light of the Law Commission’s Proposals, CONV., Jan.–Feb. 2003, at 38–60 (recognizing the French right to housing as a
fundamental right). For international agreements recognizing a fundamental right
to housing, see Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 25(1),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (“Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including .
. . housing . . . .”); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A, at 11(1) (Jan. 3, 1976), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate . . . housing . . . [and] will take appropriate steps to insure the realization of this right . . . . ”).
12
Peter Salins commented that one of the typical concomitants to good cause
eviction provisions, rent regulation, “is not only entrenched, it is spreading. Like
alien creatures in a science fiction movie, the tentacles of rent regulation have long
since wandered from historic epicenters such as New York City and now reach every
corner of this nation.” Peter Salins, Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient
Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1988).
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through which the social goal of decent housing for all is to be
13
achieved. The creation of a mass of new public housing is certainly
14
a possibility. But just as likely is the continuation of an old European favorite—maintaining a scheme of good cause eviction, both in
the public and private rental housing sectors, to control supply.
The base notion of a good cause eviction scheme is that a landlord’s ability to terminate or refuse to renew his tenant’s lease, and
therefore force the tenant to navigate a possibly perilous housing
15
market to find new accommodations, must be limited substantially.
Regardless of the fact that a tenant may have no lease at all, or that
the term of the lease he once had may have expired, he may continue
in the rental housing unless and until the landlord offers a good
16
enough reason to evict him.
Good cause eviction rules are pervasive in European countries,
and are almost universally designed to rectify housing crises, particu17
larly those caused by housing shortages.
The evidence, however,
demonstrates that they do not solve supply problems, and in fact may
even impede achievement of social housing goals by creating new
economic problems.
With the proliferation of housing problems all over the globe,
and an increased awareness of and call for action on those problems
like the one seen in France, a real danger exists that good cause eviction requirements will spread worldwide. Even in the United States,
these dangerous schemes have begun to take hold.
This Article seeks to call awareness to that problem and to suggest that further intrusion must be prevented. Part II describes the
13

Law No. 2007-290 of March 5, 2007, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 5, 2007, p. 4190, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires”
hyperlink).
14
The French government intends to construct 120,000 new homes per year until 2012 in an effort to implement this new guarantee of housing. See French PM Vows,
supra note 6. In 2000, France spent €19.27 billion on various housing assistance programs, including €2.05 billion in construction subsidies, €5.34 billion in aid to individuals, and €9.39 billion in tax relief. Embassy of France in the United States, Housing in France, available at http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/housing.asp.
15
Kenneth Salzberg & Audrey Zibelman, Good Cause Eviction, 21 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 61, 62–63 (1985).
16
Id. Good cause eviction is premised on a “tenant’s presumptive right to continue in possession.” Id.
17
Housing shortages following World War I led to the adoption of good cause
eviction schemes in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy. See infra Part
II. In the United States, post-war housing shortages led to the imposition of a good
cause eviction scheme in Washington, D.C. See infra notes 292–94 and accompanying
text.
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growing global movement toward limiting tenant eviction to good
cause. The law of several European jurisdictions serves to illustrate
the varying forms and effects of a good cause eviction scheme. Part
III goes on to describe the reasons for which a jurisdiction’s adoption
of a good cause eviction scheme represents a serious misstep. The
negative and substantial long-term economic effects are detailed.
Part IV demonstrates that good cause eviction schemes are slowly infecting even American law. Finally, Part V suggests that if we are not
successful in warding off the further intrusion of good cause eviction
schemes in this country, we will suffer. Good cause eviction rules will
fail to solve housing crises here, just as they have in Europe. And just
as we are seeing abroad, in the long term, we may end up worse off
for their adoption.
II. THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO LIMIT
LANDLORD ABILITY TO EVICT OR REFUSE TO RENEW LEASES
Schemes of good cause eviction are quite prevalent throughout
Europe. Those countries that have adopted them with the hope of
solving serious housing problems are by no means small or insignificant actors on the international scene. Germany, Italy, and France,
for instance, all limit the right of a landlord to evict his tenant, or to
18
refuse to renew an expired lease, to good cause. Smaller countries,
19
such as Portugal and Austria, have followed suit.
Precisely what will satisfy the requirement of good cause varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Faulty or culpable behavior on the
part of the tenant—such as failing to pay rent for an extended period, conducting illegal activities on the premises, or breaching the
20
lease in some significant way—almost always suffices. Some good
18

See D.C. STAFFORD, THE ECONOMICS OF HOUSING POLICY 45 (1978) (describing
the English trend toward security of tenure over the last decade).
19
See SANDRA PASSINHAS, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAWS—PORTUGAL 1 (2004),
available at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Pro
jects/TenancyLawPortugal.pdf; BRIGITTA LURGER & ANDREA HABERL, EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF
PRIVATE LAW—AUSTRIA 1 (2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/Research
Teaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawAustria.pdf. The European
Tenancy Law project, of which both of these articles are a part, is an ongoing research project of the European Private Law Forum at the European University Institute concerned with a comparative assessment of national tenancy laws among European Union countries.
20
See, e.g., MARÍA ESTHER BLAS LÓPEZ, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—SPAIN 10–
11, (2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPriv
ateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawSpain.pdf (Spanish grounds for eviction include, inter
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cause eviction schemes even provide for more landlord-focused reasons, including the landlord’s desire to demolish or remodel his
21
building, or perhaps even to occupy it himself.
While it may seem at first blush that there really is no common
thread among jurisdictions employing the scheme as to what that
good cause might be, further study brings a commonality to light.
Nearly every jurisdiction that limits landlord eviction to good cause
interprets it in a very narrow fashion and heavily skews it in favor of
the tenant.
A. An Exceptionally Narrow View of Landlord Need as Good Cause
Perhaps one of the more commonly proffered “good causes” for
which landlords seek to evict or fail to renew the leases of their tenants, at least absent some tenant misconduct, is their own need of the
22
premises. Given a property owner’s right to use his investment as he
so desires, one might expect jurisdictions to be rather liberal in allowing landlord need to provide the good cause necessary to evict a tenant. In fact, precisely the opposite is true. Most jurisdictions with a
good cause eviction scheme employ a very restrictive standard. Landlord “need” must, really, be more than need. It must be desperation.
Portuguese law provides an instructive example of the application of the “need” standard. The rights of landlords and tenants in
Portugal are set out both in the Portuguese Civil Code and in special
statutes, which substantially restrict a landlord’s right to bring an end
23
to a lease.
When a landlord and tenant perfect a lease contract without a
definite term in Portugal, the law supplies a default term of six

alia, failure to pay rent, intentionally causing “unauthorized works in the house,” and
using the premises for purposes other than that for which they were leased);
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 25 (good cause for eviction under Portuguese law includes, inter alia, failure to pay rent, using the premises for “unlawful, indecent and
dishonest practices,” and substantially changing the premises).
21
See infra Part II.A--B.
22
See, e.g., Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
on H.R. 355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), available at http://www.ius.info/EUII/euchr/doku
menti/1995/11/case_of_velosa_barreto_v._portugal_21_11_1995.html.
23
The Civil Code sets out the basic rules applicable to the landlord-tenant relationship in Portugal. Special statutory schemes, including the Rural Tenancy Regime
(Decree-Law 385.88, of 25.10 (1988)), Forester Tenancy Regime (Decree-Law
394/88, of 8.11 (1988)), and Urban Tenancy Regime (Decree-Law 321-B/90, of
15.10 (1990)) expand upon and further those general rules of the Civil Code in particular contexts.
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24

months. But because the law also provides for automatic renewal
for successive periods, such a lease essentially becomes a lease of indefinite duration, which lasts until one party gives notice of his con25
trary intention. The Portuguese tenant may give notice of his intention to quit without proffering any specific reason. He need only
comply with a requirement that he give the notice within a particular
26
period before he vacates. Landlords, on the other hand, are not afforded the same freedom. They may terminate only when they prove:
(1) need in themselves or their descendants to occupy the leased
property; (2) need of the leased property to build a home for themselves or their first degree descendants; (3) desire to expand the
leased premises or increase the number of leased units, but only if
the relevant public authority has already approved an architectural
plan; or (4) that public authorities have found the building to be
“degraded and, technically or economically, . . . not recommended to
27
be improved.”
Even when a Portuguese landlord can make out one of these
grounds, however, he may not succeed in retaking the premises. If
the landlord seeks to terminate for “residential purposes” (essentially
the first and second grounds), he must also prove that he has owned
28
the property for more than five years and that he (or his descendants, if he is arguing their need) cannot possibly find “another
house (owned or rented)” anywhere “in the area of the judicial districts of Lisboa or Porto or their surrounding areas, or, for another
part of the country, in the same city” that will meet their housing
29
need. This latter requirement, of course, is virtually never satisfied,
as landlords can nearly always find other, albeit less desirable, ac30
commodations.
24

PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26. Residential tenancy contracts in Portugal may
not provide a term of less than five years; when they do, they are typically considered
indefinite term contracts subject to the rules detailed here. Id. at 24.
25
Id. at 26.
26
The length of the notice required depends upon how long the lease has existed. Tenants must generally give six months notice to leave a lease that has lasted
more than six years, sixty days for leases lasting between one and six years, thirty days
for leases lasting between three months and a year, and one-third of the duration for
leases lasting less than three months. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1055 (Port.) (1966);
see also PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26.
27
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26–27.
28
This requirement does not apply where the landlord acquired the property “by
hereditary succession.” Id. at 27.
29
Id.
30
A landlord’s existing cramped living area shared with seven other people, for
instance, would likely supply cause for denying his claim to evict tenants under the
Portuguese need standard because that landlord has a home. See generally Velosa
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Moreover, even where a Portuguese landlord meets every one of
these exceptionally rigorous requirements—he proves a dire need,
five years ownership, and a lack of any other housing possibility—he
may have to suffer through a delay before the eviction will be carried
out. Portuguese courts are empowered to delay evictions for up to a
31
year “for social reasons.” Specifically, if a court finds that contemporaneous enforcement of a valid eviction order would effect
“greater prejudice to the tenant than benefits [to] the landlord” or
“[w]hen it is the tenant’s poverty that motivates the lack of payment
of rent” (for which, of course, the landlord could legitimately evict),
32
it is authorized to impose a stay on the eviction. Analyzing such social mores might involve considering the parties’ “good faith, the fact
that [the] tenant may become homeless, the number of persons living with the tenant, his or her age, his or her health, and, in general,
33
the social and economic condition of the people involved.”
34
The case of Velosa Barreto v. Portugal illustrates the breadth and
inequity of the Portuguese need standard. Applicant Velosa Barreto
inherited a three-bedroom, one-bath home in the Portuguese city of
35
Funchal. The home had been rented for roughly eighteen years before Velosa Barreto became owner, with a rent that increased by only
36
twenty-five percent during that period. Five months after he inherited the home, Velosa Barreto brought an action against the tenant,
seeking to end the lease so that Velosa Barreto and his family could
37
occupy the home.
Velosa Barreto argued that his family had a true need for the
38
home, which justified the termination of the tenants’ lease. Specifi-

Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 355 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.) (refusing landlord’s request to evict tenant to personally occupy space because
landlord had alternative accommodations).
31
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 28.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
35
Id.
36
Id. The facts of Velosa Barreto do not clarify the precise term of the lease on the
subject property. Because the Portuguese Civil Code provides for continual tacit renewal in the absence of tenant notice to quit, however, the lease can be likened to an
American periodic tenancy. See C. CIV. art. 1095 (Port.) (1966), repealed by DecreeLaw 321-B/90, of Oct. 15, 1990 (reenacting rule as part of new Urban Tenancy Regime).
37
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
38
Id.
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cally, he pointed to his own unsatisfactory living conditions. At the
time of his suit, Velosa Barreto lived in a four-bedroom rental with his
wife and son, his mother- and father-in-law, his brother-in-law, and
40
41
two of his wife’s aunts. The quarters were exceptionally crowded.
Privacy for all members of the family was virtually nonexistent, and it
42
was not possible for his child to have his own room. All of the parties involved were unhappy, but “resigned” to these living conditions
43
because he and his family had “nowhere else to live.”
44
After the litigation stretched on for nearly six years, the Funchal court denied Velosa Barreto’s application for an order authorizing the eviction, finding that he had not sufficiently shown “facts
45
which proved a real need to occupy the house himself.” The court
particularly noted Velosa Barreto’s failure to prove exceptionally
46
strained relations with his in-laws. That the family got along rather
well personally and made the best of an ugly situation actually hurt
47
Velosa Barreto. In the absence of proof of all out warfare in the
household, the Funchal court concluded that Velosa Barreto and his
48
family had no real “need” for a home of their own.
On appeal to the Lisbon Court of Appeals, the Funchal court’s
49
judgment was affirmed. Finally, in 1991, Velosa Barreto appealed to
50
the European Commission of Human Rights, which ultimately re51
ferred the case to the European Court of Human Rights.
Velosa Barreto argued before the European Court of Human
Rights that the Portuguese court system’s refusal to grant him an or39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
44
Id. The European Court of Human Rights opinion provides no hint as to the
reason for the lengthy delay. Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
50
Id.
51
Id. The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 as a mechanism to enforce the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950. Portugal ratified the Convention on Sept. 11, 1978. See European Court of Human Rights—The Court,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+t
he+Court.
40
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der allowing termination of the lease amounted to a violation of Arti52
cle 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On its own
motion, the Court also examined Velosa Barreto’s application to determine whether there might also be a violation of Article 1 of Proto53
col 1 of the Convention.
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
54
freedoms of others.

Protocol 1 provides similarly:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or
to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penal55
ties.

Velosa Barreto argued that Article 8 implies a right in every fam56
ily “to a home for themselves alone.” He maintained that Portugal’s
failure to allow him to assert that right by evicting his tenant
amounted to an unacceptable intrusion on his rights under Article
57
8.

52

Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
53
Id.
54
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
55
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Protocol 1, Mar. 20, 1952, Eur. T.S. No. 009. Portugal ratified Protocol 1 on Sept. 9,
1978. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms—Ratification Dates, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Com
mun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=009&C-M=8&DF=2/21/2008&CL=ENG.
56
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
57
Id.
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In assessing Velosa Barreto’s application, the European Court of
Human Rights was required to examine Portuguese eviction law in
58
some detail. Its role was not to determine whether Velosa Barreto
met the legal requirements for eviction; that fell within the province
of the Portuguese courts, which “were clearly better placed than the
59
European Court to assess the facts at a given time and place.”
Rather, the European Court of Human Rights was to determine
whether the Portuguese legislation provided a restraint on landlords
that rose to a level sufficient to impinge on the benefits they enjoy
60
under the European Convention on Human Rights.
In so analyzing the Portuguese tenancy termination rules, the
Court found that the goal of the good cause eviction scheme was “a
61
legitimate [one], namely the social protection of tenants.” In essence, the restrictions “tend[] to promote the economic well-being of
62
the country and the protection of the rights of others.” Essentially,
then, the Court found that Portugal could, in accordance with the
language of Article 8, subordinate the right of a private landowner to
the economic wellbeing of the country.
To satisfy itself that such subordination was “necessary,” as Article 8 requires, the Court looked to the history surrounding the enactment of the Portuguese Civil Code articles restricting eviction to
63
need on the part of the landlord. At one time, such onerous intrusions upon the right of the landowner to retake his property were
considered absolutely necessary in light of a severe shortage of hous64
ing in Funchal. By the time of Velosa Barreto’s action, however,
65
census records demonstrated that no such crisis persisted. Nonetheless, the European Court of Human Rights accepted Portugal’s
argument that strict tenancy termination provisions continued to be
66
necessary to avoid economic decline. Thus, the Court voted eight
to one that Velosa Barreto’s Article 8 “right to respect for his family

58

Id.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
59
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and private life, his home and his correspondence” yielded to Portu67
gal’s need to restrict that right in the interest of economics.
Similarly, the Court found that Protocol 1 allowed for governmental fixing of eviction standards. Although the plain language of
the provision prohibits deprivations of “peaceful enjoyment of possessions,” it allows for the creation of exceptions states may find necessary to “control the use of property in accordance with the general
68
interest . . . .” In essence, Protocol 1 requires only that the Portuguese eviction rules “strike a fair balance between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the pro69
The European
tection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”
Court of Human Rights accepted Portugal’s argument that the application of its eviction rules to deprive Velosa Barreto of the right to
enjoy the property he owned was merely a “control of the use” of his
70
property. As such, Velosa Barreto’s interest fell, again by a vote of
71
eight to one, to his father’s tenant.
Thus, in 1995, thirty-one years after the lease began and nearly thirteen years after Velosa Barreto inherited the property at issue, he was
72
still unable to assert his right to occupy the property he owned. The
effect of the decision, then, is essentially to create a persistent and virtually interminable lease. Velosa Barreto could hardly have shown a
more substantial need to occupy his property. Still, it was not
enough.
Tenant protections are clearly exceptionally strong under the
Portuguese regime. Indeed, commentators well-versed in the country’s tenancy law have remarked that “the main feature of the regime
is the protection of the tenant, considered to be the weaker party to
73
the contract.”
67

Id. One dissenter found that the court did not give sufficient weight to the
possibility that Velosa Barreto might choose to increase the size of his family, a right
the dissenter viewed as an important element of family life. Id. The dissent also concluded that the majority did not strike a fair balance between the protecting the right
of the landlord (to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions) and the right of the tenant. Id.
68
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 1; see Jeremy McBride, The Right to Property, 21 EUR.
L. REV. HUM. RTS. SURV. 40, 45–47 (1996) (discussing a “remarkably indulgent
view . . . of the overriding right of property owners to recover their apartments from
tenants”).
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And the arguably egregiously broad tenant protections that exist
in Portugal, surprisingly, are not the most stifling provisions one can
find in Europe. The basic Swedish rule of lease termination is that a
74
tenant “enjoys the right to prolong [his lease] contract.” A tenant’s
right to persist on the premises may only be set aside if his reasons for
renewing his contract are not as strong as his landlord’s reasons for
75
terminating the agreement. Furthermore, landlords are at a significant disadvantage in Sweden because, even under this balancing test,
if a landlord rents an apartment dwelling to a tenant on an indefinite
duration lease, the landlord’s argument that he has true need of the
property for his own use will “not be a sufficient reason for terminat76
ing the contract.” Swedish law does make concessions for a land77
lord renting out a family home. True need may provide grounds
for giving notice to end a lease in these cases, “at least if [the land78
lord] intends to live [on the premises] permanently.” But a person
letting an apartment dwelling has no such freedom.
The trend in Europe, then, is to sanction landlord need as a
technical way of making out the good cause needed to evict or refuse
to renew the lease of a tenant. But the Portuguese and Swedish examples demonstrate that need is viewed so restrictively that, practically speaking, landlord desire to personally occupy the rented premises hardly ever rises to the level of “good cause.”
B. An Overemphasis on Protection of Weak Tenants
The history of Italian landlord-tenant law demonstrates quite
well the related trend of European tenancy law to overprotect tenants
that could be viewed as the least bit socially disadvantaged. Substantial regulation of the law of leases began in Italy shortly after World
War I, when financial strife and a short supply of housing created
79
problems in the country’s rental housing market. The Italian government responded in 1921 with a double-featured plan that both
74

Jordabalk [JB] [Land Law Code] 12:3 (Swed.). See ULF JENSEN, EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF
PRIVATE LAW—SWEDEN 3 (2004), available at http://iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/
EuropeanPrivateLaw/TenancyLawSweden.pdf.
75
JENSEN, supra note 74, at 24.
76
Id. at 22.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
UMBERTO BRECCIA & ELENA BARGELLI, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—ITALY 1
(2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/law/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw
/Projects/TenancyLawItaly.pdf.
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80

controlled rent and prevented termination of tenancy contracts.
Even in the post-war economy, that system “was considered an assault
81
on individual property rights.” The regime provoked so much outrage that, while it was not expressly held unconstitutional, the Italian
Constitutional Court suggested that the regime be jettisoned and replaced with a more practical system for regulating tenancy as soon as
82
practicable.
The post-war Italian system was revamped in the 1970s and a new
and complete statute for regulating both residential and commercial
83
tenancies took hold in 1978. The new statute focused primarily on
setting standards for rents. Because of this focus, it was dubbed the
84
“equo canone” (or “fair rent”) law. The scheme was “founded upon
the rationale of distributive justice” and thus greatly emphasized tenant need and the right to housing over the desires of landlord85
owners. The overt protections given to tenants seemed broad, but
perhaps not totally slanted, at least on the face of the statute. Shortterm tenancy contracts were not permitted under the equo canone law.
Parties were not allowed to perfect lease contracts for periods shorter
86
than four years. And the landlord, at least, was bound to continue
87
the lease for the duration of the agreed-upon term. Tenants, in
contrast, were permitted to end even a term lease merely by giving six
88
months notice. Regardless of the length of the lease, the most tenant-friendly aspect of the equo canone law was that part which took the
setting of the rent completely out of the parties’ hands. Rent was
fixed by law, and was not a subject on which the parties were permit89
ted to come to their own agreement.
However these rent and term restrictions looked on paper, they
were applied by the Italian government in a manner exceptionally
oppressive to private property owners. And even worse, when rent
controls and intrusions into parties’ freedom of contract in the form
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id. The Court further hinted that it would not hesitate to strike down the regime were it not replaced within a reasonable period. Id.
83
Id. at 2.
84
See id.; see also Kenneth Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 735 (1983) (noting that Italy’s equo canone law was
based on the idea that equity would be obtained in the housing market if comparable rents were established for comparable units).
85
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 1.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
81
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of long-term tenancy requirements did not succeed in creating a
housing situation that the Italian government found desirable, it resorted to layering suspension of eviction orders on top of the rent
90
and term provisions in a manner that further prejudiced landlords.
The case of Spadea v. Italy perfectly demonstrates the problem of
Italian focus on the socially disadvantaged party to the lease con91
tract. Applicants Spadea and Scalabrino purchased two residential
92
flats in Milan, Italy in April of 1982. The flats were rented at the
time of the purchase, with leases set to expire on December 31,
93
1982. In October of that year, the applicants properly gave notice
to the tenants occupying the flats, requesting that they vacate the
94
premises at the expiration of the lease term. The tenants, “elderly
95
ladies of modest means,” refused to budge. Spadea and Scalabrino
requested eviction orders from a local magistrate, and those orders
96
were issued in January of 1983. Two years later, in 1985, the tenants
still refused to vacate and the Italian government would offer no po97
lice assistance in securing the eviction. Moreover, in February of
1985, the Italian government suspended enforcement of all eviction
98
orders for another eleven months. Shortly after that eviction en99
forcement order was lifted, another came into effect. And then yet
100
another. As the years wore on, Spadea and Scalabrino were forced
101
to buy another flat just so as to have a place to live.
Spadea and Scalabrino finally recovered possession of their flats,
102
six and seven years after the leases on them terminated. Even then,
it was not a result of a change in Italian law, but rather as a result of
103
fortuity. One tenant died and the other eventually left voluntarily.
If the Spadea case were an exceptional one, we might lament it as
an unfortunate, but not dangerous, set of circumstances. When
viewed as anomalous, it seems, perhaps, less egregious. Unfortu90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 14–15.
Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 12868/87, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996).
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Spadea, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Spadea, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 484.
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nately, a glance at even a small portion of the Italian landlord-tenant
jurisprudence quickly proves that what happened to Spadea and
Scalabrino was not at all rare. Scores of landlords met similar fates
under the Italian tenancy regime of the 1980s. In another Italian
eviction case that made its way to the European Court of Human
104
Rights—Scollo v. Italy —the plaintiff-landlord complained of eviction
staggering and suspension orders that prevented him from evicting a
105
tenant whose lease had ended more than eleven years earlier.
Much like the applicants in Spadea, Scollo regained possession of his
property, eleven years after the termination of the lease and after
seven years without full payment of the agreed upon rent, solely be106
Likewise, in Immobiliare Saffi v. Itcause the tenant voluntarily left.
107
aly, the applicant company regained possession of its property thir108
Police assistance was never given
teen years after the lease ended.
109
to secure the eviction, but the tenant eventually died.
In short, the Italian regime of the late 1970s and 1980s was one
that effected serious oppression of landlord interests in the name of
social justice and economic development. The series of eviction suspension orders issued during this time were often referred to as necessary and “emergency” measures to quell a serious shortage of low110
income housing.
But the fact is that the purportedly “emergency”
111
provisions remained in effect for more than forty years. Subordination of landlord interests, then, essentially became the norm in Italy.
The equo canone regime—both in its obsessive rent controls and
corollary eviction suspension orders—was soon recognized as an unacceptable one. Cases such as Spadea, Scollo, and Immobiliare Saffi illustrated the flaws of the Italian tenancy laws and eventually led people
to conclude that the regime’s effect was the opposite of that intended. In practice, it failed to solve the problem of a small supply of
adequate low-cost housing, but rather “dissuaded landlords from let112
ting their property, thus increasing demand.”
For these reasons, the equo canone regime was set aside in 1998,
at least insofar as residential properties are concerned, in favor of a
104

App. No. 22774/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 514 (1999).
Id. at 515–16.
106
Id. at 516.
107
App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756 (1999).
108
Id. at 759.
109
Id.
110
See id. at 758; Scollo, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 525 (Mr. H.G. Schermers, dissenting);
see also BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 1–2.
111
McBride, supra note 73, at 46.
112
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 2.
105

CARROLL_FINAL

3/30/2008 1:43:04 PM

2008]

GOOD CAUSE EVICTION

443

113

new regime. The goal of Italy’s new tenancy law was to effectuate a
“trade off” between the typically diametric interests of landlords and
114
tenants. Whether the regime actually accomplishes this lofty goal is
a matter on which interested parties may never come to agreement.
The 1998 statute essentially relies on a combination of duration
and termination provisions to effectuate the tenant protection that
115
Italy has long desired as a matter of social policy.
Residential lease
116
This is
contracts may not establish a term of less than four years.
already an obviously onerous provision for landlords. Typically, however, it gets even worse for them. The statute allows a landlord to retake his property after the termination of the lease, provided he has
117
given the tenant at least six months notice to vacate.
The problem
is that this notice will only be effective if the landlord has “legitimate
118
The expiration of the lease
grounds” for terminating the lease.
term, surprisingly, is insufficient to supply such a ground. Essentially,
a landlord will only be permitted to retake his premises after the expiration of the original lease when he can demonstrate that his “in119
terests take priority over [the] tenant’s right to housing.” In effect,
the landlord is forced to show some sort of “good cause” for evicting
a tenant whose term lease has expired.
This “good cause” or “legitimate ground,” as one might imagine
given Italy’s historical penchant for protecting tenants, garners a narrow definition in Italian law, though perhaps it is not so narrow as in
Portugal. A landlord’s desire (presumably, need is not required) to
“use the apartment for himself or his family members for housing or
120
professional purposes” will suffice.
Anything less is rather difficult
to allege as a legitimate reason for enforcing the termination of an
already expired lease. A landlord may technically make out good
cause where he wishes to use the premises not for living or for working, but for “public, cultural, [or] religious purposes,” but only when
121
he also offers the existing tenant an alternate accommodation.
113

Id.
Id. at 13.
115
Id.
116
Id. This rule applies where the landlord and tenant freely negotiate the lease.
The minimum duration is shortened to three years where the parties allow landlord
and tenant associations to supply a ceiling for the rent. Id.
117
Id.
118
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 14.
119
Id. at 13.
120
Id. at 14. The landlord is allowed to terminate a tenancy on this ground only
after serving six months’ notice (after completion of a four year tenancy). Id.
121
Id.
114
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In the absence of proof of a legitimate ground, the Italian lease
122
renews for another four years. At the end of the reconducted lease
term, again, the landlord may terminate only upon giving a sixmonth notice to his tenant, but this time, no legitimate ground for
123
The mere expiration
termination is needed along with the notice.
of the lease term is sufficient ground for recognizing the end of the
parties’ relationship.
In effect, then, absent “good cause,” an Italian landlord is stuck
with a lease lasting at least eight years! And even worse, after this
eight years expires, he may still find himself unable to retake possession of his property. Just as striking as the good cause provisions of
the 1998 statute is the fact that it carries forward, albeit in modified
form, the notion behind the eviction suspension orders of the 1978
124
Although eviction suspension is not generally proItalian regime.
vided for as it was in 1978, the 1998 statute retains it “if the house is
125
situated in a highly populated municipal district.”
In such areas, a
valid eviction order is typically suspended for six months. And where
the tenant is “unemployed,” sixty-five years old, or has at least five
126
Thus, a
children, the suspension stretches to eighteen months.
landlord that entered into a simple four-year lease—the very shortest
duration Italian law would allow him to perfect—may find himself
stuck with a lease of nearly ten years with no way out.
Unfortunately, Italy is not alone in overprotecting tenants. In
Germany, perhaps the biggest tenant protection comes from the fact
that lease contracts limited in time are generally not allowed. The
German Civil Code provides that such a “fixed term contract can only
127
be concluded if the landlord has a reason for such a limitation.”
Legitimate reasons for perfecting a term contract would include the
landlord’s desire to live in the premises himself, or a planned renovation that would not be possible or would be overly burdensome if a
128
The landlord must inform his
tenant were living on the premises.

122

Id. at 15.
Id.
124
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 15.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See WOLFGANG WURMNEST, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—GERMANY 37, available
at http://www.iue.it/law/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/Tenanc
yLawGermany.pdf; see also Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18,
1896, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I], as amended, § 575.
128
See BGB § 575, ¶ 1; see also WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 37–38.
123
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tenant of his rationale for seeking a term contract in writing.
As a
result of these rather stringent rules, as one might imagine, most
130
leases in Germany are deemed to be contracts of unlimited time.
This extended tenure certainly provides German tenants with a large
measure of protection not present in leases perfected in the United
States.
And the German tenant protections do not stop there. Their
rules governing termination of leases by notice are also substantially
protective of tenants. Specifically, German notice provisions are
quite lopsided. A tenant may end an indefinite duration lease at any
131
time merely by giving a three-month notice. No justification is necessary. The landlord, on the other hand, “has relatively few possibili132
ties to terminate the [lease] contract.” He may terminate the lease
by giving notice only where he has a “legitimate interest” in the con133
tract’s termination. And, of course, the German Civil Code defines
this “legitimate interest” quite narrowly. The sole circumstances sufficient to warrant termination of the ongoing tenancy relationship
are: (1) tenant breach of a contractual duty; (2) landlord need for
134
the leased premises; or (3) a lease contract that “prevents the land135
lord from making an economically justifiable use of the premises.”
The restrictive grounds for landlord notice already narrow the
factual scenarios that will give rise to a valid termination by landlord
notice quite substantially. But German law then deals another blow
to landlords who can meet this stringent burden by allowing the tenant to contest the termination and demand continuation of the lease
if termination “would give rise to hardship for the tenant or his family
that would be unjustified even in the light of the legitimate interests
136
Moreover, even if the interests of the landlord
of the landlord.”
outweigh those of the tenant and the eviction is deemed lawful and

129

WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 38.
See id.
131
See id.; see also BGB § 573c, ¶ 1.
132
WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 34.
133
Id.
134
This requirement can be satisfied by a personal need on the part of the landlord, or a need of one of his family members, though German courts have been reluctant to find the notice proper for need of a brother-in-law or sister-in-law. Id. at
35–36.
135
See id. at 34; see also BGB § 573, ¶ 2.
136
WURMNEST, supra note 127, at 34. Some German leases are exempt from these
harsh requirements. The rules set out here do not apply, for instance, where the
landlord is living in the premises himself. Id.
130
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appropriate, a court may delay it upon the tenant’s request for up to
137
one year “to avoid hardship.”
And if the Italian and German examples are not telling enough,
the modern French tenancy law is perhaps the most overt European
example of an emphasis on the rights of the tenant at the expense of
landlords. The bulk of the current French landlord-tenant law was
enacted in 1981 by a socialist regime that believed the thrust of tenancy law should be to “protect the weak party against the stronger,
i.e.[,] the tenant against the landlord. Tenants were considered to be
abused by unscrupulous landlords taking advantage . . . [of their lack
138
Several revisions have modified the French
of] legal protection.”
tenancy regime since 1981, but its salient features remain. Tenants
are exceptionally well-protected. As with most European landlords,
French landlords may terminate lease contracts only for “legitimate
139
and serious reason.”
Perhaps the most tenant-friendly aspect of French law is its
treatment of eviction enforcement. In all cases, French judges have
absolute discretion to grant tenants délais de grâce of up to three years.
The court must find that “seriously unfair consequences could result
140
from the eviction” to grant such a delay.
But presumably something less than abject homelessness will do. Waiting for the end of
the school year for the children or completing an employment project, for example, may provide sufficient grounds for postponement
141
Even more tenant-friendly, however, is the
of an eviction order.
French rule that no landlord may evict a tenant during the winter.

137

Id. at 36.
NATALIE BOCCADORO & ANTHONY CHAMBOREDON, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE
LAW—FRANCE 2 (2004), available at http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/Euro
peanPrivateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawFrance.pdf.
139
Such reasons include, inter alia, the desire to sell the leased property and the
desire to live on the premises or to allow a family member to do so. Law No. 89-462
of July 6, 1994, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], July 8, 1989, p. 8543, art. 15, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” hyperlink); see also BOCCADORO &
CHAMBOREDON, supra note 138, at 2. This requirement is less protective of tenant
rights in France than it is in other countries discussed herein, however. This is true
because the indefinite duration lease is prohibited under French law. Thus, when we
speak of a landlord “giving notice,” that notice is one that will end a fixed term lease.
Nevertheless, lease terms are protective of French tenants, since they may be perfected for a minimum of three years (or six years if the landlord is a legal entity
rather than an individual). Id.
140
BOCCADORO & CHAMBOREDON, supra note 138, at 18.
141
Id.
138
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The effect of this delay of grace is to suspend evictions for more than
142
one third of every year—namely, from November 1 to March 15.
In short, European tenancy regimes can be characterized as almost shockingly protective of tenants—at the expense, of course, of
their landlords. Good cause eviction schemes alone offer tenants a
wealth of protection. And when the grounds for good cause are interpreted narrowly, or the good cause scheme is bolstered with eviction suspension orders for “weak” occupants, landlords suffer significant disadvantages.
III. THE DELETERIOUS ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF A GOOD CAUSE SCHEME
Even setting aside the fact that rules requiring good cause for
tenant eviction or lease nonrenewal may represent a theoretically unjustifiable balancing of the interests of equally innocent and needy
private parties, such rules should be rejected because they are detrimental from an economic standpoint. The majority of jurisdictions
that have adopted a good cause eviction standard have done so to
solve particular economic crises. Yet both basic economic theory and
empirical evidence demonstrate that good cause eviction rules have
nearly the opposite economic effect of that intended.
A. Exacerbating the Problem of Dwindling Supply
Stringent restrictions upon the right of landlords to evict tenants
are typically enacted in times of housing shortage. The idea is a
rather simple one. If a great deal of affordable rental housing is not
available, government feels pressure to act to protect tenants and to
ensure that they are able to retain the housing they have for as long
143
as possible.
The easiest way for the law to promote tenant protection is to impose a requirement upon landlords to refrain from evict142

Id. The suspension begins from October 15 in Paris. Law No. 90-449 of May
31, 1990 [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 2, 1990, p. 6551, art. 21, available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les autres textes législatifs et réglementaires”
hyperlink). The Polish landlord-tenant regime provides a similar winter suspension
from November 1 to March 31 “for humanitarian reasons.” EWA GROMNICKA &
PRZEMYSLAW ZYSK, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW—POLAND 33 (2004), available at
http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/Tenancy
LawPoland.pdf.
143
Robert G. Lee, Rent Control—The Economic Impact of Social Legislation, 12 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 543, 544 (1992). The goal of rent control, at least, is “to choke off
speculation (or price inflation) in times of economic crisis, when strong demand
faces a limited supply.” SHLOMO ANGEL, HOUSING POLICY MATTERS: A GLOBAL
ANALYSIS 120 (2000).
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ing their tenants absent good cause, often layered with controls on
144
the rent imposed.
One failing of this strategy is that it can never achieve a long
term solution to the problem it seeks to remedy. Both requirements
of good cause eviction alone and the rent controls that typically accompany them actually serve to discourage new investment in rental
property, and thus hold stagnant the existing level of rental housing
supply. Potential investors are highly unlikely to purchase rental
properties knowing that they will be subject to an especially stringent
145
eviction standard. First, the effective loss of the ability to dispose of
the property substantially disincentivizes housing market invest146
ment.
What prospective landlord would pursue rental investments
in the face of the utterly abysmal fates that befell the landlords in the
147
148
Velosa Barreto and Spadea cases? The landlords’ inability to make
any use of the properties in those cases or even to sell the property
for anything approaching a reasonable rate of return certainly offends notions of the rights that should be afforded to the owners of
149
private property.
It is not surprising, perhaps, that the sale of
144

Rent controls are almost always a part of a good cause eviction scheme because, in the absence of a controlled rent, a landlord desiring to end a lease without
good cause would escape the lease merely by raising the rent until it reached a level
impossible for the tenant to meet. No “eviction” would occur, and the landlord
would therefore avoid liability. Lawrence Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law—
Are Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L. REV. 707, 727–28 (1981).
Literally hundreds of volumes have been published both defending and attacking
rent control. It seems that both legal scholars and economists are split as to whether
it provides any real economic benefits. This paper focuses on good cause eviction,
not rent control, while recognizing that rent control may play a significant role in an
overall scheme of good cause eviction. For an influential and thorough debate of
the multitude of issues raised by rent control schemes, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988)
and the eight responses printed in that same volume, id. at 1215–80. The effect of
rent control from a purely theoretical economic perspective is nicely explored in
Steven N.S. Cheung, A Theory of Price Control, 17 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1974).
145
See Berger, supra note 144, at 730.
146
While, in theory, a landlord with a tenant subject to eviction only for good
cause may always just sell his property, reality demonstrates otherwise. The hit the
landlord takes on market value is typically significant enough to make disposal, at
least practically speaking, an unacceptable option. Lee, supra note 143, at 551–52.
147
Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
148
Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 12868/87, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 (1996).
149
In civil law systems, property owners are afforded the right to use the items
they own, or to derive the fruits of them. But perhaps the most important feature of
true ownership is the right of the owner to dispose of that which he owns in any
manner he sees fit. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTARIE DE DROIT CIVIL [TREATISE
ON THE CIVIL LAW] pt. 2, No. 2332, at 380 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans. 1959)
(1939) (“That which characterizes the right of ownership . . . is the power of dispos-
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rental units with “sitting tenants” that may only be evicted for good
cause typically brings thirty to forty percent less than their vacant
150
The financial effect of a landlord’s assumption of a
counterparts.
rental subject to the good cause eviction requirement—particularly in
a case like Scollo, where no rent was paid for more than seven
151
152
Of course, these conseyears —is astoundingly discouraging.
153
quences also stymie other would-be investors.
Even beyond the significant and direct financial disincentive imposed by a good cause eviction requirement, there is a more subtle
and emotional disincentive. The mere “fear of being unable to evict
a disliked tenant,” even after the initial term of the landlord-tenant
relationship has expired, has been referred to as a “potential loss of
154
psychic income.”
This emotional consideration has been shown to
155
British landbe nearly as significant to landlords as financial ones.
lords, for instance, typically express a greater dissatisfaction with security of tenure provisions than they do with their rent control coun156
terparts.

ing of the thing, by consuming it, by physically destroying it and by transforming its
substance.”).
150
Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756, 778
(1999).
151
Scollo v. Italy, App. No. 19133/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 514 (1996) (Eur. Ct.
H.R.).
152
The Scollo facts are not confined to Italy. They could easily be duplicated in
the United States. Extreme tenant protection has resulted in making eviction extremely difficult for landlords, even where their tenants have stopped paying rent.
PETER D. SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION 73 (1980). In this way, the
rules of tenancy depart from almost every other contractual relationship known to
the law. In other sale and lease transactions, payment of the price is a necessary
component of the relationship between the parties. The merchandise provided must
also be of a certain quality. But if it falls short, the remedy is “an annulment of the
transaction.” Id. at 74. Buyer receives a return of the price and seller gets the good
back. “Under almost no circumstances is the remedy for an unsatisfied purchaser/lessee the continued enjoyment of the ‘flawed’ good or service for free.” Id.
153
But see Kenneth K. Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore a Free Market?,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1989) (suggesting that the empirical evidence on
the effect of rent control on supply is varied). A few studies have found “no correlation between rent controls and the volume of apartment construction.” Id. at 1233.
154
Lee, supra note 143, at 551.
155
See JOHN ALLEN & LINDA MCDOWELL, LANDLORDS AND PROPERTY 43 (1989). Evidence submitted to Britain’s Environment Committee indicated that small landlords
(of which there were over 500,000) considered security of tenure legislation to be a
“major influence” upon their decision to rent residential property. Id.
156
Likewise, studies demonstrate that security of tenure “is the single most important determinant of housing demand for all households, overshadowing the importance of both the quality of structures and the amount of living space.” See ANGEL,
supra note 143, at 315; see generally Axel Börsch-Supan, Econometric Analysis of Discrete
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Second, the illiquidity of a rental home burdened by good cause
eviction requirements dissuades investors. Real estate investors are
more likely interested in a long-term, stable investment than are in157
vestors in, for instance, the stock market. But even real estate investors typically desire a somewhat fleeting arrangement. The illiquidity
resulting from good cause eviction rules and the “problem of gaining
access to the capital [invested] at the most opportune time may be
158
The onsufficient to dissuade” even the most committed investor.
going, near perpetual nature of a lease subject to a good cause eviction rule deprives the landlord of the ability to sell at a “vacant pos159
session price,” effectively controlling his ability to exit as owner.
Limiting the potential investor’s exit opportunities in such an extreme way is not only theoretically objectionable, but is practically
160
When investment in an uncontrolled (or, at least,
unworkable.
more reasonably controlled) private market (including the stock
market, for instance) is easily and readily available, there simply is not
sufficient incentive for investors to turn to the housing market. A focus on other investments makes more sense.
Good cause eviction requirements, then, certainly discourage investment in the market for rental housing, either through the purchase of existing dwellings devoted to rental or through the construction of new rental dwellings. But the rules may do even greater
damage by depleting the existing rental housing stock. In light of the
negative financial and emotional constraints outlined above, landlords newly faced with good cause eviction requirements tend to opt
for conversion of their rental dwellings at the earliest possible oppor161
They will convert their rental properties to alternative,
tunity.

Choice with Applications on the Demand for Housing in the U.S. and West Germany, 296
LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS 118 (1987).
157
A 1995 survey of private property owners and managers revealed that their
primary reason for acquiring rental property was to earn rental income (for small
property owners) and long-term capital gains (for medium and large-scale property
owners). HOWARD SAVAGE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED ABOUT
PROPERTIES, OWNERS, AND TENANTS FROM THE 1995 PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS
SURVEY 1 (1998), http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/h121-9801.pdf.
158
See Lee, supra note 143, at 552; see also HAROLD L. WOLMAN, HOUSING AND
HOUSING POLICY IN THE U.S. AND U.K. 63 (1975).
159
KARN & WOLMAN, supra note 3, at 144.
160
See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
567–70 (2001) (property regimes that make “exit impractical . . . or that unreasonably delay exit [are] incompatible with the most fundamental liberal tenets”).
161
See Epstein, supra note 144, at 763–64. Of course, since a tenant typically may
not be evicted because of the landlord’s conversion desires, the landlord must often
wait for the existing tenant to voluntarily vacate the premises. See WOLMAN, supra
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higher-value uses in order to reap larger returns on their often significant financial investments. This may involve converting the property into a dwelling for their own use, or perhaps converting it into
162
Good cause eviction requirements create incondominium living.
centives for such conversions by diminishing the value of investments
in rental housing and thereby decreasing existing rental stock. The
regulation, therefore, causes the very depletion of housing that it at163
tempts to remedy.
The United Kingdom’s experience with good cause eviction and
rent control nicely illustrates investor reaction to the disposal and il164
liquidity effects of those legal rules.
Long periods of good cause
eviction accompanied by rent control there have “progressively para165
lyzed the supply of houses for rent and perpetuated shortage.” The
percentage of British households accommodated by the rental housing market plummeted from ninety percent to less than seven per-

note 158, at 63 (landlord desiring to convert must either “bribe” existing tenants to
move or wait for them to leave voluntarily).
162
See Epstein, supra note 144, at 765; see also Louis M. Rea & Dipak K. Gupta, The
Rent Control Controversy: A Consideration of The California Experience, 4 GLENDALE L. REV.
105, 134 (1981). Many cities have enacted ordinances curtailing the rights of property owners to convert property to condominiums. For example, Pleasanton, California, passed a 2006 ordinance requiring any person seeking to convert rental
property into condominiums to grant a right of first refusal to low income tenants.
PLEASANTON,
CAL.,
CODE
§
17.04.100
(2007),
available
at
http://qcode.us/codes/pleasanton. The law further provides that very low income
tenants have the right to continue their existing leases for nine years from the date of
notice of intended conversion. Id. These rules were established to “minimize or
avoid the hardship caused by the displacement of tenants.” Id. § 17.04.030. San
Francisco regulates condominium conversion through a lottery system under which
only 200 units per year are allowed to be converted. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.,
SUBDIVISION CODE § 1396.1 (2007). In addition to providing such a small number of
conversions, the Code provides that landlords must provide for temporary tenant relocation and must bear the cost of moving expenses for any tenant. Id. §§ 1392–1393.
Applications to the conversion lottery are prohibited if a landlord has had two or
more evictions after May 2005 or even one eviction, if it involved a senior citizen, disabled person, or catastrophically ill tenant. Id. § 1396.2.
163
See, e.g., Thomas S. Nesslein, Market versus Planning: An Assessment of the Swedish
Housing Model in the Post-war Period, 40 URB. STUDIES 1259, 1269 (2003).
164
The British first adopted good cause eviction rules (along with rent control) in
the early twentieth century as a measure to remedy housing shortages caused by
World War I. And although their tenancy rules have changed rather dramatically
since, good cause eviction remains as a key feature of the United Kingdom’s tenancy
regime. THE LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 162, RENTING HOMES 1:
STATUS AND SECURITY 23, 51–52 (2002), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.
uk/docs/cp162.pdf [hereinafter RENTING HOMES]; see generally DAVID HUGHES ET AL.,
TEXT AND MATERIALS ON HOUSING LAW 118–56 (2005).
165
STAFFORD, supra note 18, at 114.
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166

cent after the adoption of a good cause eviction scheme.
The purported solutions to the severe housing shortage in the United King167
dom have only encouraged landlords to keep their flats empty or to
make altogether different investments. In the wake of its good cause
eviction rules, England has seen significant occurrence of empty
property, a record number of homeless, and slow-rising capital re168
turns.
All of these effects can be attributed to a widening of the
supply-demand gap that should have been anticipated. Restricting a
landlord’s right to such an extreme degree will necessarily disincentivize him from supplying his social good, exacerbating the problem
of an already low supply. Good cause eviction as a solution for remedying low supply fails because it “contravene[es basic] micro169
economic rules of supply and demand.”
If a state is going to reduce private profit and thereby diminish
speculative activity in the rental market, its only hope of not realizing
a perpetuation of the low supply problem would come with increased
170
The market effect of disincentivizing
state production of housing.
individual investment activity creates a need for the state to play a
171
substantial role in the production of new housing.
Historically,
governments have shied away from performing such functions—
either because of the significant resources required to competitively
supply adequate housing or because of concern that, for political rea172
And where
sons, such activities are best left to the free market.
government has attempted to remedy low supply through its own in-

166

Ray Forrest & Alan Murie, Restructuring the Welfare State: Privatization of Public
Housing in Britain, in HOUSING NEEDS & POLICY APPROACHES: TRENDS IN THIRTEEN
COUNTRIES 97–109 (Willem van Vilet et al. eds., 1985).
167
WOLMAN, supra note 158, at 63.
168
STAFFORD, supra note 18, at 114.
169
Salins, supra note 12, at 775.
170
See generally LEONARD SILK, SWEDEN PLANS FOR BETTER HOUSING 74–83 (1948).
The French government, for example, to make good on its promise to provide adequate housing to all its citizens, plans to produce over 120,000 housing units per year
for the next five years. See French PM Vows, supra note 6.
171
The risk extends beyond the tenants subject to good cause eviction. See generally Michael Schill, Comment on Chester Hartman and David Robinson’s “Evictions: The
Hidden Housing Problem,” 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 503, 506 (2003). Schill argues
that tenancy restrictions like rent control can also have a negative impact on nonrent controlled tenants of the landlord. According to Schill, a landlord who can
make up for decreased rent from one tenant by increasing that collected from another likely will. And where this is not possible, he is likely to cut back maintenance
of all his holdings, and possibly even abandon the property. Id.
172
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 540 (R.H. Campbell ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1979) (1776) (describing the struggle between free market capitalism and government regulation).
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volvement in housing production, the results have been disappointing at best.
Sweden provides the clearest illustration of a failed government
173
control model.
To rectify shortages in the wake of World War II,
Sweden opted for government regulation of all features of housing
174
production, including the type and cost of housing construction.
The idea was that housing shortages were caused, at least in part, by
excessive construction costs and that government control could solve
175
To effectuate
that problem and thereby reduce costs to tenants.
this shift, the Swedish government controlled rents, imposed a good
cause eviction scheme, and controlled production with subsidized fi176
Unfortunately, however, pushing housing construction
nancing.
out of the capitalistic market and essentially creating a “socialist hous177
ing market” has caused building costs to skyrocket to untenable
178
rates. Rising costs are not the only failure of the system. Socioeco179
nomic segregation in Sweden is worse than ever. The Swedish government assumed that simultaneous controls of rent and production
173

See Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1269; see generally Deborah Kenn, One Nation’s
Dream, Another’s Reality: Housing Justice in Sweden, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 63 (1996) (describing Sweden’s good cause eviction regime).
174
Kenn, supra note 173, at 80–81.
175
Id.; see also Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1270.
176
Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1262.
177
Kenn, supra note 173, at 80.
178
Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1270. By 1985, Swedish housing costs were reported to be forty-three percent above the average of those of other European countries and thirty-five percent above those of the United States. Id. By 1990, those
building costs had increased to twice as high as those in the United States. Id. As of
the mid-1990s, Swedish housing costs were still twice as high as those in this country,
even after adjusting building costs for the economies of scale associated with larger
housing square footage in the United States. Id. at 1271. This disparity is thought to
be caused, in part, both by the lack of competition in the construction industry and
by the development of “special economic-interest groups,” including construction
and building materials firms, housing bureaucracy groups, municipal housing companies, and national housing cooperatives. Id. These groups have an economic incentive to “subsidi[ze] away” rising building costs in order to support” otherwise noneconomically viable new construction. Id. In contrast, the American, largely freemarket housing system has generated construction costs considered to be the lowest
among high-income countries. Id. at 1265. Housing costs per square meter, as of
1990, according to the Global Housing Indicators Program were: (1) Japan–$2604;
(2) Finland–$1734; (3) Sweden–$1527; (4) Norway–$1426; (5) Germany–$1305; and
(6) the United States–$500. Id.
179
Id. at 1274. In 1997, a Swedish government investigation revealed that in the
country’s three largest cities—Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo—class segregation was more pronounced than it had been at any time during the pre-War period.
Id. In those areas, unemployment often exceeds fifty percent. Id. The study noted
that residential segregation had begun to overlap with social and ethnic segregation.
Id.
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would provide housing opportunities to all income groups and eliminate segregation by ethnicity and socioeconomic status, but quite the
180
All in all, most housing experts and econoopposite has resulted.
mists agree that the Swedish model has not worked and should not
181
be emulated.
The result of good cause eviction rules is somewhat of a Catch22: The rules necessarily perpetuate, if not overtly cause, housing
182
shortages.
But if the government steps in to remedy that shortage
by controlling the construction market, the high costs that result
183
cause the housing market to further suffer.
The only real solution
is to avoid the Catch-22 by rejecting good cause eviction requirements altogether. The free market for rental housing certainly has its
flaws, but none so great as those resulting from good cause eviction
184
schemes that seek to remedy them.
B. Decreasing the Quality of Existing Rental Housing
Even beyond the serious supply problem that rules requiring
good cause for tenant eviction create, there is a more fundamental
problem with the theory. The trend in the post-World War era is to
impose good cause eviction as a sort of measure to guarantee the
185
right of quality, affordable housing to all mankind.
But the effect
180

Id. at 1273–74.
Id. at 1277 (“The general lesson is that both theory and much real-world evidence strongly suggest that the Swedish model is not a model that should be emulated in the search for equitable and efficient housing outcomes.”). But see Kenn,
supra note 173, at 63 (lauding the Swedish system as an “available prototype” for the
United States).
182
At least one author has found rent control, which almost necessarily includes a
good cause eviction rule, to be the most significant predictor of homelessness. See
William Tucker, Where do the Homeless Come From?, NAT’L REV., Sept. 25, 1987, at 41.
183
Shlomo Angel, in his excellent work on global housing policy, has characterized the debate as one between enabling and nonenabling government intervention
and has aptly noted that “[n]either laissez faire nor the centrally planned economy
have survived the test of time.” ANGEL, supra note 143, at 13.
184
See generally Lenore Schloming & Skip Schloming, Comment on Chester Hartman
and David Robinson’s “Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem,” 14 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 529 (2003). According to the Schlomings, who are President and Executive
Director of the Small Property Owners Association, rental housing is an exceptionally
un-monopolistic market. Id. at 536. Using 1990 Census data, the authors estimate
that seventy-five percent of rental housing is owned, not by large investors, but by
small-scale landlords. Id. “No business sector in the country has as many owners,
with holdings inversely small. . . . The natural searching and matching of owners to
tenants in such a highly diversified market is freedom itself, with the desire to find
good owners/good tenants constraining both sides to behave themselves.” Id.
185
See BELG. CONST. art. 23 (describing constitutional and legislative “rights to
housing” in several nations).
181
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of imposing good cause eviction requirements, ironically, is to actually decrease the quality of rental housing.
Good cause eviction requirements insure stability for tenants
and, particularly if they are accompanied by rent control, tend to
push tenants toward maintaining their status quo as renters rather
than purchasing their own homes. Well-respected sociological research demonstrates that people simply do not care for items they are
186
using in the same manner as items they own.
The incentives good
cause eviction requirements create for tenants, therefore, serve to
lessen the continuing quality of the premises they occupy.
Further, the necessarily lengthy term of leases with good cause
eviction requirements increases the dilapidation of rental housing by
187
increasing costs and narrowing the landlord’s rate of return. Faced
with a significantly less profitable investment, a landlord is likely to
make only those repairs absolutely required, to do so in the cheapest
188
manner possible, and to do so only when forced. Continued maintenance of rental property simply becomes increasingly unprofitable
189
under a good cause eviction scheme.
Likewise, the landlord is
186

Even in long term rental situations, property owners are the only parties with a
stake in maintaining the value of their property, and thus they are the parties most
likely to take steps to preserve that value. See, e.g., ANGEL, supra note 143, at 85.
187
In Sweden, for instance, researchers have found that rental housing consists
primarily of highly dense spaces, “monotonous in design and with little attractive
landscaping,” that because of lack of maintenance and “problem tenants” has fallen
into serious disrepair. Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1266.
188
See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 144, at 61; Schloming & Schloming, supra note
184, at 533 (describing small property owners, the paradigmatic low-cost housing
owner, as blue collar individuals, “typically just one to two steps above their tenants
on the income scale,” who often self-maintain and “delay costly capital improvements as long as possible[, nursing] a leaky roof and old plumbing along to squeeze
out a few more years of life before spending big bucks”).
189
George Sternlieb described well the reality of the landlord’s dwindling returns
to the United States House of Representatives in 1971:
One of the most satisfying figments of folklore in our times is the
portrait of the slum landlord. A typical vision is that of the central city
slums being the fiefdom of a small group of large investors. The latter
in turn grow very fat indeed on the high rents and low input which
their tenants and buildings are subjected to.
I have called it a satisfying illusion because it has in turn permitted
us the belief that all that is required in low-income housing was a repartitioning of an already adequate rent pie. Whether through code enforcement, rent controls, or any of a host of other mechanisms, the
problem of good maintenance could be resolved by squeezing some of
the excess profits out of landlords’ hands. This process would still
leave enough of a residue to maintain his self-interests in the longevity
and satisfactory quality of the structure in question.
This bit of folklore may have had considerable validity a decade or
two ago. It has little relationship to the realities currently.
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highly unlikely to take any steps to improve the premises (beyond
190
merely “repairing” that which is broken) under such a scheme.
The illiquidity of the rental housing as an asset and the very length of
time inherent in the investment would prevent or, at the very least,
substantially diminish, the landlord’s ability to ever realize the gains
191
of improving the housing. And so, once again, good cause eviction
requirements, by disincentivizing landlords from repairing and improving the land they own, tend to diminish the overall stock of qual192
ity rental housing.
C. Encouraging Inefficient Housing Allocation
It is well-established that rent control encourages inefficient allocation of housing. Specifically, it encourages tenants to overconsume space and stay in places they neither need nor would be
193
Good cause eviction
able to afford absent regulation of the rent.
requirements also necessarily entail this problem. In fact, a tenancy
scheme adopting good cause eviction compounds it; essentially, the
risk under such a regime is magnified, as it exists both at the high
and low ends of the scale.
Lease contracts with a good cause eviction requirement are typi194
cally required to have a somewhat lengthy term.
Indeed, the good
cause component would not offer the tenant the protection for which
the scheme is designed if the parties were permitted to perfect a lease
contract for an exceptionally short term. The combination, then, of
the tenant security that comes with a good cause eviction requirement, the lengthy term of the lease, and the likelihood that rent control exists will, at the very least, encourage tenants to stay in the prem-

Abandonment and Rehabilitation: What is to be Done?, Papers Submitted to the Committee on
Banking and Currency, 92d Cong. 315, 316–317 (1971) (statement of George
Sternlieb). See WOLMAN, supra note 158, at 66; see also KARN & WOLMAN, supra note 3,
at 144 (British landlords attempted to rectify the negative effects of rent control
through undermaintenance).
190
SALINS, supra note 152, at 92–93.
191
Lee, supra note 143, at 551–52.
192
See, e.g., David Kiefer, Housing Deterioration, Housing Codes, and Rent Control, 17
URB. STUDIES 53, 54 (1980); see also Salins, supra note 12, at 777 n.10.
193
Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1268; Lee, supra note 143, at 546; see also Epstein,
supra note 144, at 762 (noting that a wealth test, which relies on ability to pay, better
matches persons with available premises, “with a minimum of fuss, bother, and political intrigue”).
194
Italian residential lease contracts may not be established for less than four
years. French tenants have the right to a three-year minimum lease. Fixed duration
lease contracts are generally not allowed at all in Germany. See supra notes 86, 130,
and 139 and accompanying text.

CARROLL_FINAL

2008]

3/30/2008 1:43:04 PM

GOOD CAUSE EVICTION

457

ises longer than they otherwise might. As the tenant’s family structure changes—either expanding or contracting—the tenant remains
stagnant. For the sector of society subject to a controlled tenancy re195
gime, “inefficient distribution of housing consumption” results.
While rent control encourages tenants to over-consume, keeping a
larger apartment than necessary because of artificially low rent, a
good cause eviction requirement encourages both over- and underconsumption to avoid leaving the security of an existing tenancy for
the highly uncertain prospect of more suitable housing.
Moreover, the ridiculously high transaction costs and lengthy
wait that typically befall those renters seeking increased space stands
as a “substantial impediment to a household’s ability to raise [its]
196
The Swedish rental housing market, for inhousing standard.”
stance, is plagued by significant difficulties in tenant mobility. Government control over housing production without sufficient marketbased information has resulted in a significant concentration of “av197
Ninety percent of the rental units in
erage-sized rental dwellings.”
198
Sweden have only three bedrooms.
Upgrading to a dwelling with
the needed space proves impossible, or exceptionally onerous, for
many families.
The effect of a non-market-driven and inefficient allocation of
rental housing is somewhat staggering. Substantial waste is created
under such a scheme, because new and appropriately-sized housing
must be constructed for families not able to find adequate vacant
housing. A 1990 study of the Swedish rental housing market
estimated that if a small proportion of elderly Swedish households
relinquished their dwellings to larger families, the volume of construction could be reduced substantially. Over a twenty-year period, it was estimated that it would be possible to reduce new construction by . . . roughly eighteen percent of total housing
199
production . . . .
200

In an increasingly populated world, such results should be pursued.
Achieving efficiency in housing allocation will serve to ensure that the
195

Nesslein, supra note 163, at 1268 (referring to rent regulation only).
Id.
197
Id. at 1268–69.
198
Id. at 1269. When compared with the fact that more than half of Swedish
owner-occupied homes have five bedrooms, this evidence is quite telling. Id.
199
Id. at 1268.
200
According to 1998 estimates and projections of the United Nations, the world
population is growing at 1.33 percent per year, an annual net addition of about 78
million people. World population in the mid-twenty-first century is expected to be in
the range of 7.3 to 10.7 billion and likely, by 2050, 8.9 billion. World Population Nears
196
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goal of a housing policy that supports a good cause eviction
201
scheme—namely, providing adequate housing for all—is met.
D. Pushing Tenancies into the Black Market
There is one significant practical effect of good cause eviction
limitations that is almost certainly unintended, and likely unanticipated, by proponents of the rules. The evidence shows that the significant disadvantages of good cause eviction schemes often cause
landlords to seek more workable alternatives elsewhere. The result is
a movement away from legal tenancy regimes altogether and into
other, less desirable, relationships.
In some cases, potential landlords disappointed with the effect
of a mandatory good cause eviction scheme have chosen to reject
tenancy in favor of an unlawful, totally uncontrolled, and even untaxed, “black market” relationship. Poland, for instance, has had a
problem with the proliferation of black market tenancies in the wake
202
of the adoption of a good cause eviction regime.
The parties to
such a relationship essentially attempt to operate outside the bounds
of the law altogether, foregoing every benefit of a legal constraint
203
upon both landlord and tenant.
Even in American jurisdictions with good cause eviction schemes
such black markets have emerged, though in a slightly less extreme
fashion than that seen in Poland. In New York, the passage of rent
control, along with good cause eviction limitations, has led to “brib204
“Key money” arrangements
ery and under-the-table payments.”
have developed elsewhere whereby the landlord agrees to give the
tenant the protection mandated under a legal tenancy regime, but
205
In these bribrequires him to pay an upfront fee for the privilege.
ery and key money cases, the tenant may actually receive some of the

Six Billion, U.N. CHRON., November 4, 1998, available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/
chronicle/1998/issue4/498p33.htm.
201
Lawrence C. Becker, Rent Control is Not a Taking, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1215, 1218
(1989).
202
See GROMNICKA & ZYSK, supra note 142, at 30.
203
Id.
204
Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 132.
205
See Cheung, supra note 143, at 63. For example, after restricting the right of
landlords to set or alter rent levels, the British government felt compelled to enact
the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920, making the demand of “key money” payments and other bribes a criminal offense. RENTING
HOMES, supra note 164, at 23; see also Epstein, supra note 144, at 741 (relating an experience wherein he lost a “steal” of an apartment because, in his naiveté, he did not
know that the building superintendent “needed to have his palm smeared”).
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benefits of a legal tenancy regime, but only upon being forced to pay
a sum for which he is not legally obligated.
In other jurisdictions, landlords have not gone so far as to attempt to establish an extra-legal relationship, but rather have purposefully attempted to avoid the legal tenancy regime in favor of a
different legal bond. In the United Kingdom, for example, a good
cause eviction scheme layered over rent control has led to a prevalent
practice on the part of owners to offer occupants “licenses” rather
206
than leases. These owners “hoped [the licenses] might fall outside
the scope of the [tenancy] legislation, so that their properties were
not subject to rent regulation and their occupiers did not have long207
The license attempts have sometimes
term security of tenure.”
been successful in avoiding the salient features of the tenancy regime,
208
Regardless of the outcome, however, these atand sometimes not.
tempts at circumventing the appropriate legal relationship have been
exceptionally expensive to the taxpayer, who is left holding the bag
for judicial resources expended to enforce the good cause eviction
209
scheme adopted by his legislators.
E. Increasing Litigation
The pragmatic effect of good cause eviction requirements on the
judicial system is substantial and negative. Such a regime tends to increase litigation between landlords and tenants in a number of ways.
For example, the good cause eviction requirement gives the landlord
an incentive to exploit relatively minor tenant breaches of contract.
In a free market for rental housing, landlords are likely to overlook
small tenant infractions, as pursuing eviction is time-consuming, ex210
pensive, and unlikely to provide much long-term benefit.
Where
the tenant is paying the market rate, the gains for the landlord are
211
likely to be minimal.
At best, the landlord will reap minor financial, though perhaps slightly more substantial emotional, reward if he
206

See RENTING HOMES, supra note 164, at 28.
Id.
208
Compare A.G. Securities v. Vaughan, [1990] 1 A.C. 417 (H.L.), with Street v.
Mountford, [1985] A.C. 809 (H.L.).
209
See Edgar Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1081,
1087 (1972).
210
Epstein, supra note 144, at 764.
211
See id.; see also AIMCO Properties, L.L.C. v. Dziewisz, 883 A.2d 310, 313 (N.H.
2005) (“Replacing one tenant upon the expiration of a lease with another tenant
who will pay the same rent and occupy the same position as the tenant being evicted
does not, in and of itself, provide the landlord of restricted property with any economic or business advantage.”).
207
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dislikes his tenant. In a heavily regulated tenancy regime, however,
the situation is quite different. Faced with an exceptionally long term
lease, very likely an artificially-fixed low rent, and the inability to end
the relationship absent good cause, the landlord is likely to look for
that good cause wherever the slightest possibility of establishing it ex212
ists. The possibility of construing minor tenant infractions as “good
cause” for eviction gives the landlord an escape valve where before
there was none. “Removal for cause typically allows the landlord to
recapture a substantial portion of the unit’s value . . . by removing the
unit from controls by ‘rehabbing’ it, or by selling it as a condomin213
ium.”
With the parties no longer willing or able to resolve their
214
disputes informally, courts must take on the added responsibility.
Moreover, rules requiring good cause for tenant eviction necessarily expand the court’s role in policing the landlord-tenant relationship to prevent the tenant harassment that is more likely to flow
215
under a good cause eviction scheme than under a free market.
Where the landlord is desperate to end the lease and remedy a sinking investment, the good cause eviction scheme may leave him little
hope. His inability to dispose of the property at will, particularly if he
finds no tenant misconduct to rely upon, certainly encourages him to
take any and all necessary steps to induce the tenant to leave volun216
tarily. Tenant harassment may result.
The costs of enforcing a rent control regime in New York for just
one year—1968—were estimated at $270 million, “a cost which was
217
borne by the taxpayers.”
Such increased cost and workload is a
212

Epstein, supra note 144, at 764.
Id. at 765.
214
Id.; see also Schloming & Scholoming, supra note 184, at 532 (noting that the
eviction proceeding, which was originally supposed to be a quick, summary proceeding to regain possession of one’s property, “has been turned into a potentially very
lengthy one by letting tenants or their lawyers file counterclaims against the owners
as part of the eviction process itself,” in effect prolonging litigation).
215
See Lee, supra note 143, at 551.
216
The most notorious example of such tenant harassment was that perpetrated
by Perec Rachman, a British landlord in the 1950s. Rachman handled tenants he
found unprofitable by either offering them cash to vacate, making their lives intolerable with loud music blaring at all hours of the night, or by cutting off their utilities
and/or damaging their plumbing. Rachman’s ill practices became so well known
that inappropriate behavior by landlords has since been dubbed “Rachmanism.”
RENTING HOMES, supra note 164, at 25 n.22; see Dave Cowan & Alex Marsh, There’s
Regulatory Crime, and then There’s Landlord Crime: from ‘Rachmanites’ to ‘Partners’, 64
MOD. L. REV. 831, 837 (2001) (debates about Rachman’s shenanigans were partly responsible for the rise of the Labour Party which enacted Britain’s “emergency” housing legislation).
217
See Olsen, supra note 209, at 1089–95; see also Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at
132 n.81.
213
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problem that both the legislatures and the courts of jurisdictions
propounding good cause eviction tenancy schemes must be prepared
to handle.
IV. THE DISTURBING INVASION OF GOOD
CAUSE EVICTION IN THE UNITED STATES
If the phenomenon of limiting tenant evictions to situations in
which the landlord can demonstrate good cause were limited to the
European countries, we might write the development off as a relatively benign one. Indeed, American and European laws, particularly
those concerning property, are quite different and developments in
218
one region often do not carry over elsewhere. Unfortunately, however, this is not true of good cause eviction requirements. Although
their acceptance in the United States does not come close to rivaling
that of their European counterparts, good cause eviction requirements are increasingly creeping into the law of the American states.
The sources of and rationale for adoption of good cause eviction
requirements in this country have been varied. But more and more,
they are beginning to reflect what could be characterized as the
European view—that tenant eviction must be limited to good cause to
honor a social policy—the right to decent housing for all individuals.
This view first permeated the public housing market. But today it has
crept into even the market for private housing, and thus constrains
landlords who lease with no governmental involvement.
A. In the Public and “Quasi-Public” Housing Sectors
Public housing markets have long subjected the federal government landlord to stringent requirements not applicable to landlords
219
in the private market.
The rationale is that public housing is a
form of welfare from the federal government, one to which the re220
cipient is entitled. This entitlement gives rise to a property interest,
which is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

218

Andrea B. Carroll, Examining a Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred Years of Riparian Misconception, 80 TUL. L. REV. 901, 943 (2006) (noting differences between civil
and common law property schemes).
219
Marc Jolin, Good Cause Eviction and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 521, 521–22 (2000).
220
Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Ressler v. Pierce, 692
F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Section 8 program tenants held constitutionally protected property rights); Jeffries v. Ga. Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d
919, 925 (11th Cir. 1982).

CARROLL_FINAL

3/30/2008 1:43:04 PM

462

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:427

221

Amendment.
The government may not, therefore, evict a public
222
housing tenant at will. The federal courts have held that evicting a
tenant from public housing merely because his lease expired would
infringe upon the “property interest” the tenant has to continue re223
In
ceiving his entitlement until there is cause to deprive him of it.
the public housing context, then, the landlord—the federal government—has subjected itself to a prohibition on evictions absent good
cause.
This prerequisite of good cause to evict has been extended beyond traditional public housing—that owned by the federal government—and now applies equally to “quasi-public” landlords. Where
“the federal government has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the landlord that it must be recognized as a
224
joint participant in the landlord-tenant relationship,” the landlord
is “quasi-public” and also constrained by the good cause eviction
225
rules.
Such a situation exists, for instance, where the government
226
offers tax
partly finances the construction of private housing,
breaks or mortgage interest rate reductions for the construction of
227
228
low-income housing, or subsidizes tenant rent.
“Section 8” hous229
ing is the most well-known program of this type, and even before its
written provisions expressly restricted landlords to evictions for good
221

See Joy, 479 F.2d at 1241; see also Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342,
1346 (4th Cir. 1982) (Section 8 statutory “good cause” eviction requirements implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
222
Housing and Urban Development Termination of Tenancy and Modification
of Lease, 24 C.F.R. § 880.607 (2007). Section 880.607(b)(1)(iv) provides that “no
termination by an owner will be valid to the extent it is based upon a lease or a provision of State law permitting termination of a tenancy solely because of expiration of
an initial or subsequent renewal term.” Id. (emphasis added). The good cause provisions in § 880.607 apply to the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program, Section 202
Direct Loan Program, Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program, and
Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities Program. In addition
to providing specific grounds for termination, the regulations provide that eviction
for “other good cause” cannot occur unless the landlord has first provided prior notice of the offensive behavior to the tenant. 24 C.F.R. § 880.607(b)(2).
223
Joy, 479 F.2d at 1241.
224
Green v. Copperstone Ltd. P’ship, 346 A.2d 686, 697 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1975).
225
Joy, 479 F.2d at 1242.
226
Green, 346 A.2d at 695.
227
Id.
228
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 535 (1983).
229
See 24 C.F.R. § 880 (2007). The Section 8 program aims to provide low-income
families with “decent, safe and sanitary rental housing through the use of a system of
housing assistance payments” paid to public or private housing owners. Id.
§ 880.101(a).
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cause, several courts of appeals held that such an interpretation was
230
necessary in light of the property interests held by the tenant. The
intrusion upon the rights of the landlord is significant, but logical
where the landlord has depended upon the aid of the federal government to achieve or maintain his status. In these “quasi-public”
situations, it is still the federal government that can fairly be called
231
the landlord.
Courts in this country typically hold both public and quasi-public
landlords to a good cause eviction standard because they view it as
the only possibility for meeting a social goal. Congress articulated
that “national goal” in the Housing and Urban Development Act to
be “a decent home and suitable living environment for every Ameri232
can family.”
The good cause eviction requirement, it was hoped,
would insure “adequate, safe and sanitary quarters” and “an atmos233
phere of stability, security, neighborliness, and social justice.”
This
social goal, and the expectation of tenure that it is said to create, has
even been held by the Fourth Circuit to rise to the level of a “cus230

See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1345 (4th Cir. 1982);
Rushie v. Berland, 502 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (applying good cause
requirement before Section 8 expressly required it); Greenwich Gardens v. Pitt,
484 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1984) (articulating “well settled” view that Section 8 tenants are entitled to good cause protection). Since 1981, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) has expressly provided for eviction only for good cause.
231
Green, 346 A.2d at 697 (citing Appel v. Beyer, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1974)).
232
The policy statement reads:
The Congress affirms the national goal, as set forth in [the Congressional Declaration of National Housing Policy] of a decent home and a
suitable living environment for every American family.
The Congress finds that this goal has not been fully realized for
many of the Nation's lower income families; that this is a matter of
grave national concern; and that there exist in the public and private
sectors of the economy the resources and capabilities necessary to the
full realization of this goal.
The Congress declares that in the administration of those housing
programs authorized by this Act which are designed to assist families
with incomes so low that they could not otherwise decently house
themselves, and of other Government programs designed to assist in
the provision of housing for such families, the highest priority and emphasis should be given to meeting the housing needs of those families
for which the national goal has not become a reality; and in the carrying out of such programs there should be the fullest practicable utilization of the resources and capabilities of private enterprise and of individual self-help techniques.
Congressional Affirmation of National Goal of Decent Homes and Suitable Living
Environment for American Families, 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1968) (adopted as part of
the Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968)).
233
McQueen v. Druker, 317 F.Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970).
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234

tom.”
Under this view, even without an express congressional articulation of a good cause eviction requirement, for public and quasipublic landlords, the requirement would exist nonetheless.
One can persuasively quibble with the imposition of good cause
eviction rules even in the public and quasi-public arenas, particularly
questioning whether they are capable of furthering the goal at which
235
But their imposition in these domains is at least
they are aimed.
somewhat justifiable. Where the federal government acts as landlord,
it should be able to subject itself to restrictive termination provisions,
as it so desires. Likewise, when it operates as the de facto landlord
(though a private person holds title), it should be able to condition
its provision of assistance upon the imposition of restrictions on termination, as it so desires.
B. In the Private Housing Sector
It is in the market for housing that is entirely private that the invasion of good cause eviction is most disturbing. And the move toward requiring that even private landlords with no governmental
connection refrain from evicting their tenants (even after the expiration of a term lease) without some “good cause” has only gained sway
in the United States over the last one hundred years.
The groundwork for the American sanctioning of good cause
eviction requirements in the private market was laid in Block v.
236
Hirsh, a 1921 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In that case, Hirsh, a Washington, D.C. landlord, attempted to evict
237
his tenant after the term of the lease had run.
The tenant, Block,
argued that eviction was improper, since the District of Columbia
Rents Act at that time prohibited a landlord from evicting a tenant,
238
Hirsh
even when his lease was expired, without other good cause.
countered that such a rule would “cut down” his right “to do what he
239
will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases.”
The Supreme Court upheld Block’s right to retain possession of
the rented premises and rejected landlord Hirsh’s contention that
240
the result amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The Court justified its decision by pointing out that the effect of the D.C. Rents Act
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973).
See supra Part III.
256 U.S. 135 (1921).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 157.
Id.

CARROLL_FINAL

3/30/2008 1:43:04 PM

2008]

GOOD CAUSE EVICTION

465

241

was a fleeting one. The statute was emergency legislation passed in
the wake of World War I to combat an increasingly stressed rental
242
This emergency legislation was only to last two
housing market.
243
years, further indicating that it was appropriately aimed at solving
the post-War housing problems of Washington, D.C. Hirsh’s interests
were, therefore, set aside, and his lease to Block presumably perpetually continued, at least until Hirsh could make out some just cause for
Block’s eviction.
1.

The Spread of Good Cause Eviction Across America

Post-Block, good cause eviction requirements took hold in some
states and municipalities as a set of rules applicable to rental housing
in general and in still more as a set of special rules applicable only to
particularly “vulnerable tenants.” Viewing these jurisdictions together clearly demonstrates that the good cause eviction requirements so prevalent in Europe are making no small gains in the
United States as well.
a.

The Market for Ordinary Dwellings

244

Good cause eviction requirements imposed upon ordinary dwellings in this country have come in a number of forms. Some exist only
as a corollary to and enforcer of a scheme of rent control. Others
stand alone as default rules applicable to virtually all dwelling places.
i.

Good Cause Eviction as a Corollary to Rent Control

Although good cause eviction schemes currently exist in a num245
ber of American jurisdictions, perhaps the most well-known scheme

241

Id. at 154.
Block, 256 U.S. at 154.
243
Id.
244
The phrase “ordinary dwelling” is used here in contrast to special dwellings,
such as mobile homes, discussed supra Part IV.B.1.b.
245
See, e.g., Arizona Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1476 (LexisNexis 1975); Arizona Recreational Vehicle LongTerm Rental Space Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-2143 (LexisNexis 2000); Connecticut
Mobile Manufactured Homes, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21-80 (1974); District of Columbia
Rental Housing Evictions, D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001); Florida Mobile Home
Park Lot Tenancies, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.061 (West 1984); Massachusetts Local
Control of Rents and Evictions, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40 § 1-9 (West 1970); New
Hampshire Termination of Tenancy, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (1985); New Jersey Removal of Residential Tenants, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000); New
York Rent Control Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408 (McKinney 1985). For an example of a local ordinance adopting good cause provisions, see Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22.3 (2002).
242
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hails from New York. Good cause eviction is in place there to effectuate a scheme of rent control that New York City has had since
246
The gist of the New York law is that a tenant may not be
1943.
evicted, “notwithstanding the fact that the tenant has no lease or that
his or her lease . . . has expired or otherwise terminated” absent certain
statutorily prescribed grounds or until the landlord obtains the nec247
essary “certificate of eviction.” Seven grounds for which a landlord
may evict are then set out, most of them geared toward tenant mis248
conduct.
The landlord’s rope under this statute is tied tight. A property
owner seeking to recover possession for his own use will find himself
out of luck under the statutorily enumerated grounds. But the statute goes on to mandate that the city grant a certificate of eviction
when it finds that “[t]he landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of a housing accommodation because of immediate and
compelling necessity for his or her own personal use and occupancy
249
or for the use and occupancy of his or her immediate family.”
This “good faith” and “immediate and compelling necessity”
standard was applied to reject the landlord’s eviction request in Bu250
hagiar v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal.
Petitioner Buhagiar owned a five-apartment building that she pur251
She sought an order to evict the
chased with the intent to occupy.
tenant in a six-bedroom unit of the building so that she and her

246

SALINS, supra note 152, at 61; Rent Regulation After 50 Years—An Overview of New
York State's Rent Regulated Housing, TENANTNET NEWSLETTER 1993, available at http://
www.tenant.net/Oversight/50yrRentReg/history.html (describing what was originally intended as a “temporary emergency measure” as a now “stable fixture” in New
York, with “1.2 million of New York State’s 3.3 million rental housing accommodations . . . subject to rent regulation”).
247
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(a) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added); see also
Duell v. Condon, 647 N.E.2d 96, 99 (N.Y. 1995) (even nonsignatory to lease gets protection of New York good cause eviction scheme).
248
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(a) (McKinney 1985). The grounds for eviction
are: (1) tenant violation of lease obligations; (2) tenant commission of nuisance or
gross negligence; (3) illegal occupancy; (4) immoral or illegal use; (5) tenant refusal
to renew upon demand; (6) unreasonable tenant refusal to allow landlord access to
the rental unit for necessary repairs, improvements, or inspections; or (7) eviction
under a conversion pursuant to a written eviction plan submitted to the attorney
general. Id.
249
Id. § 26-408(b)(1). Such landlord requests are policed with treble damages; if
a landlord evicts a tenant alleging his own need and then fails to use the premises to
fulfill that need, the evicted tenant may recover treble damages, plus attorneys’ fees
and costs. Id. § 26-408(g)(1)(e).
250
525 N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
251
Id. at 202.
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daughter could personally occupy the space.
Buhagiar demonstrated that her living space at the time she sought eviction was
smaller than the space at issue (albeit by just one room), that she
paid more in rent for her smaller apartment than her tenants were
paying, and that she needed a ground floor apartment because of
253
Nevermedically substantiated knee problems and hypertension.
theless, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) essentially held that Buhagiar’s living conditions at
the time she sought the eviction order were “adequate,” and that she
therefore failed to show the requisite “immediate and compelling ne254
cessity.”
And while the New York appellate court suggested that
immediate and compelling necessity may not be restricted to “inade255
quate housing,” it affirmed the DHCR’s decision to deny Buhagiar
256
The result, of course, was that
the requested eviction certificate.
Buhagiar was simply stuck in an undesirable situation, waiting for a
tenant to voluntarily vacate, or perhaps commit some misconduct, in
order to take full advantage of her investment.
Even if a New York landlord can do what Buhagiar could not
and meet the good faith and compelling need tests, eviction certificates are unavailable, regardless of landlord need, when the tenant to
be evicted is at least sixty-two, has lived in the building for at least
twenty years, or has a permanent medical condition that disables him
257
258
from “gainful employment.” The case of Dawson v. Higgins brings
to light the severity of such a rule for the landlord. Joan Dawson purchased a Manhattan brownstone housing two rent-controlled tenants
259
She planned to evict those tenants when
in November of 1983.
their leases expired so that she and her adult family members could
personally occupy the spaces. But on June 19, 1984, just seven
months after Dawson purchased the building, the above-described
provision prohibiting eviction of any tenant who has rented for at
260
least twenty years came into effect.
“The amendment applied to
261
As
‘any tenant in possession at or after the time it [took] effect.’”
such, the statute applied to preclude Dawson from evicting the long252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

Id.
Id. at 202–04.
Id.
Id. at 203–04.
Buhagiar, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(b)(1) (McKinney 1985).
610 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 131.
Id.
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standing tenant, even for her own personal use of the brownstone.
Dawson challenged the provision as an unconstitutional taking and
262
The New York court noted particularly the wide government
lost.
263
“latitude in regulating landlord-tenant relations.”
And though it
did not explicitly so state, it evidenced a willingness to grant such latitude even when those relations are wholly private.
The restrictive interpretation of the need standard in Buhagiar,
and the extreme protection given to longstanding, elderly, or ill tenants by New York statute, serve to explain why the rental housing
market in New York is such a risky one for prospective investors. The
relationship that a party purchasing rental property enters into is an
inflexible and seemingly perpetual one. Even if a landlord is not disadvantaged by either of these rules, because he does not seek to occupy the property himself or to evict a needy tenant, he may be otherwise disadvantaged should he try to free himself of his investment.
A New York landlord may seek an eviction certificate in order to re264
model or demolish the premises, but the city is prohibited from
granting a certificate for such a purpose unless it finds that “there is
no reasonable possibility that the landlord can make a net annual return of eight and one-half per centum of the assessed value of the
265
subject property.” Thus, the New York investor is likely to consider
long and hard before purchasing rental housing. Chances are quite
good that he may never escape the investment.
ii.

Good Cause Eviction as a Default Rule of Tenancy

Through a 1974 Anti-Eviction Act, the State of New Jersey subjects nearly all tenancy contracts to the requirement that landlords
266
refrain from evicting their tenants absent good cause.
And unlike
267
New York, New Jersey’s provisions operate absent rent controls.
The New Jersey good cause eviction legislation provides that “no lessee or tenant . . . may be removed by the Superior Court from any
house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or
262

Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 132.
264
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(b)(3)–(4) (McKinney 1985).
265
Id. § 26-408(b)(5)(a).
266
See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000).
267
See Rabin, supra note 228, at 535. Similarly, voters in Oakland, California
adopted a scheme of “just cause” eviction in 2002. Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22.320(6) (2003). The ordinance that effectuates
the scheme expressly states that its purpose is to remedy a spike in evictions caused
by the elimination of rent control. Id. Thus, like New Jersey’s rules, the Oakland
good cause eviction scheme operates independent of rent control.
263
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tenement leased for residential purposes . . . except upon establish268
ment of one of [eighteen] grounds as good cause.”
That there exist eighteen causes for eviction implies that the
grounds for eviction must be rather broad; it suggests, perhaps, that
the requirement of proving good cause before evicting may even be
perfunctory. A close examination of the enumerated grounds, however, demonstrates the contrary. Landlords are well protected
against tenants that fail to pay rent, commit crimes or gross269
negligence, or otherwise breach the lease in some significant way.
But where the New Jersey landlord merely seeks to dwell in the rental
unit himself, he may find the statute wanting.
While landlords renting buildings with “three residential units or
less” need only prove their desire to personally occupy in order to
evict or refuse renewal to an existing tenant, landlords renting build270
In
ings with four or more units may not evict for personal need.
271
Stamboulos v. McKee, the landlord sought to demonstrate the invasiveness of this particular provision on landlord rights. Stamboulos
purchased a four-unit apartment building partially occupied by
month-to-month tenants who had been there for a number of
272
years. On the same day as the transfer of title, Stamboulos gave no273
The notice to defendants that their lease was being terminated.
tice to quit was given at a time when all that was required of a landlord to terminate a month-to-month tenancy in New Jersey was a
274
Twenty-six days after the notice was given—and
thirty-day notice.
just five days before the lease was to terminate—the New Jersey legis275
lature passed the good cause eviction statute described above.
Because Stamboulos’s building contained four units, his desire to personally occupy the unit was irrelevant; no good cause was
276
Stamboulos argued that the application of the new
demonstrated.
statute, and its effective deprivation of his right to occupy his own
building, amounted to an unconstitutional violation of his “funda277
mental property rights.”

268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000).
Id. § 2A:18-61.1(c).
Id. § 2A:18-61.1(l)(1)–(3).
342 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stamboulos, 342 A.2d at 531.
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The New Jersey appellate court disagreed. It first held that the
new statute applied to limit the grounds for which Stamboulos could
evict his tenant, even though he purchased the building and served
278
notice to quit before its passage.
The court held that before the
thirty-day notice had run, Stamboulos had no vested right to evict and
thus there was no problem with applying the new statute to limit him
279
As to Stamboulos’ substantive objecto evicting for good cause.
tions, the court noted his argument that the new legislation “in effect
converts a month-to-month tenancy to a perpetual tenancy, terminable . . . at the will of the tenant,” but only for “good cause” by the
280
Nevertheless, the court upheld the statute on constitulandlord.
tional grounds, finding it an appropriate exercise of governmental
281
power.
The legislative history demonstrated that the purpose of
the statute was to rectify a “critical shortage of rental housing space in
New Jersey,” and the court apparently found a good cause eviction
282
rule an adequate means of addressing that problem.
The Stamboulos court seemed to recognize the absurdity of the
statute’s failure to “permit the good faith intention of the landlord to
occupy the rented premises to serve as a reason for terminating the
283
It disclaimed any knowledge of
tenancy or obtaining possession.”
284
“whether this was an oversight or not.” Absent an express provision
in the statute providing good cause for owner desire to occupy, the
285
court did not feel it could create such a rule.
Stamboulos demonstrates well the pitfalls of a good cause scheme
286
He was prevented from making a
for the New Jersey landlord.
needed use of the property by a statute that did not even exist at the time
of his investment in the building. What potential investor would pursue rental property under such a tenant-friendly regime? In the face
of recent New Jersey jurisprudence providing that the Anti-Eviction
Act is to be “construed liberally with all doubts construed in favor of a

278

Id. at 531.
Id.
280
Id. at 532.
281
Id. at 533.
282
Id. at 531.
283
Stamboulos, 342 A.2d at 532.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Landlords seeking to “occupy” their units for business purposes, rather than as
a personal residence, have suffered the same fate as Stamboulos. See, e.g., Gross v.
Barriosi, 401 A.2d 1127 (Passaic County Ct. 1979); Puttrich v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
279
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tenant,” the potential landlord’s incentives appear all the more
287
bleak.
New Jersey is certainly not alone among American jurisdictions
with stand-alone good cause eviction regimes. Washington, D.C. has
such a regime, which, like New Jersey’s, operates independent of rent
288
control and is exceptionally tenant-friendly.
The D.C. legislation
sets out a limited number of reasons for which a landlord may termi289
And then, much like
nate or refuse to renew a tenant’s lease.
European law—particularly that of France—it forestalls eviction for
any reason, including the enumerated “good” causes, in freezing
290
Specifically, the statute provides:
weather.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no housing
provider shall evict a tenant on any day when the National
Weather Service predicts at 8:00 a.m. that the temperature at the
National Airport weather station will fall below 32 degrees Fahr291
enheit or 0 degrees Centigrade within the next 24 hours.

Washington, D.C.’s good cause eviction legislation, like that of
most jurisdictions, has been interpreted liberally, such that it rather
292
substantially restricts the rights of landlords.
Even seizing mortgagees
are bound by the D.C. law, and are therefore precluded from evicting
293
existing (non-mortgagor) tenants absent good cause.
Washington
appellate courts have acknowledged that this application of the good
cause eviction requirement “tend[s] to depress the value of the property,” but they continue to apply the statute to mortgagees nonethe294
less.
b.

“Special” Tenancies

A surprising number of American states have adopted good
cause eviction schemes for particular types of tenancy contracts that
287

224 Jefferson St. Condo. Assoc. v. Paige, 788 A.2d 296, 302 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002).
288
See D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (1985)
(providing for a scheme of good cause eviction in New Hampshire).
289
D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001).
290
Compare Law No. 90-449 of May 31, 1990 [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
June 2, 1990, p. 6551, art. 21, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow “Les
autres textes législatifs et réglementaires” hyperlink), with D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01
(2001).
291
D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01(k) (2001).
292
See Adm’r of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1165, 1168 (D.C. 1985)
(“eviction restrictions . . . are only a part of a comprehensive legislative scheme to
protect the rights of tenants and therefore must be construed liberally”).
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1170.
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state legislatures typically deem “special,” and thus worthy of hefty
tenant protection. The most striking example of such a tenancy is
that in a mobile home park. The basic principle of tenant tenure
provisions in these areas is that owners of mobile home parks may not
evict mobile home owners—and thereby force them to pick up and
295
move their mobile homes to another locale—absent “good cause.”
Much like good cause eviction requirements imposed upon tenancies in traditional dwellings, good cause eviction schemes adopted
for mobile home parks are typically passed to alleviate a “major
296
The shortage in the mobile
shortage of space for mobile homes.”
home context is often much more significant than the shortage of
rental housing stock in general because many municipalities either
“exclude mobile homes altogether” or restrict the areas in which they
297
may be set up. Demand quite often exceeds supply.
To give mobile home owners (“tenants” in the mobile home
park) some degree of protection in a landlord-focused market, a
number of states have turned to good cause eviction rules. Typically,
park owners may not evict mobile home owners except for “nonpayment of reasonable rent, continuing violation of reasonable park
rules, continuing violation of mobile home laws, or change in the use
298
To date, at least twenty states have adopted a good
of the land.”
299
cause eviction scheme for mobile home tenants.
2.

The Impact of Good Cause Eviction on American
Landlords and the Rental Housing Market

The common thread linking the New York, New Jersey, and
Washington, D.C. good cause eviction rules for ordinary dwellings
and the adoption of such schemes for special tenancies is, at base, the
295

See generally Thomas Moukawsher, Comment, Mobile Home Parks and Connecticut’s Regulatory Scheme: A Takings Analysis, 17 CONN. L. REV. 811 (1985).
296
Id. at 814.
297
Id. at 813–14.
298
Id. at 817.
299
See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.225 (1976); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1476 (1975);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 800.71 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-12-202 to -203
(West 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-80 (West 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§§ 7007, 7010A (1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.061 (West 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 9097 (1987); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8A-1101 (West 1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 32J (West 1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327C.09 (West 1982); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205A:3 (1988); N.M. STAT. ANN § 47-10-5 (West 1978); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 223 (McKinney 1974); 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 398.3 (West 1976); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-44-2 (1956); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 94.201 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-16-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6237 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
59.20.080 (West 1977). But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-47-530 (1976) (allowing a landlord
to evict if rent is not paid within five days of its due date) (emphasis added).
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implementation of social policy. Some jurisdictions purport to adopt
300
All justify
these requirements in an aim to cure housing shortages.
good cause eviction schemes by pointing to “what they perceive as a
301
strong public policy in favor of providing decent housing.”
It is a
laudable goal, of course.
The problem is that using a good cause eviction scheme to attempt to effectuate this goal necessarily, and unduly, burdens private
landlords. Who should bear the burden of ensuring adequate housing in this country—the government or private landowners? New Jersey has clearly recognized this tension and answered that question.
Its supreme court has held that application of the Anti-Eviction Act
necessarily means that “landlord rights must to some extent and on
general welfare grounds defer to the needs of the tenant population
302
Most jurisdictions are not so candid about the efin [the] state.”
fects of a good cause eviction scheme. They seem to opine that tenants deserve special protection by the law and to conclude that good
cause eviction requirements are the only—or at least the best—means
of achieving that protection. But the cost of the protection to private
individuals carrying the status of “landlord” is seldom remembered.
Two private interests are involved, and American states that adopt
good cause evictions schemes must recognize that in so doing, they
are impliedly adjudging “that the tenant’s interest in his home and
the public’s interest in maintaining the supply of rental units are
303
more important than the landlord’s investment.”
The experiences of both the European and American jurisdictions that have adopted good cause evictions schemes should certainly give a state considering the balance between landlord and tenant rights pause. Both here and abroad, empirical evidence has
shown that good cause eviction schemes serve neither to boost rental
supply nor to bolster its quality. In fact, precisely the opposite is
304
true.
In the United States, an examination of rent control schemes
imposed on ordinary dwellings demonstrates the inability of good
300

See, e.g., Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 105, 108 (noting that rent control, and
likewise good cause eviction, first gained sway in this country as a response to housing shortages caused by World War I).
301
Salzberg & Zibelman, supra note 15, at 64.
302
Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. New Mexico, 725 A.2d 1104, 1110 (N.J. 1999).
303
Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.C. L. REV. 503, 544 (1982).
304
For a discussion of the abysmal long term effects of good cause eviction in
Sweden and the United Kingdom, for instance, see supra notes 164–69, 173–81 and
accompanying text.
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cause eviction rules to remedy housing problems. Studies of rent
control schemes with good cause eviction requirements that formerly
existed in Boston, for example, have demonstrated that the regime’s
institution promoted a sixty-seven percent drop in construction in the
305
Other cities saw a boost in construction over that
private market.
306
same period. In New York, rent controlled apartments with a good
cause eviction requirement are dilapidated much more frequently
than their non-rent-controlled counterparts—a difference of twenty307
nine to thirty percent. The housing situation is so bad in New York
that one housing policy expert has remarked:
One does not have to be an advocate of laissez-faire, nor an
ideological conservative to remark that when it comes to housing
in New York, the public sector has done quite enough already.
Up to now every new increment of public intervention has made
things worse. We have taken so many unsuccessful twists and
turns along the path of well-intentioned tinkering that perhaps it
is time to test the possibility that generally reasonable incentives
and disincentives of an unconstrained market might do a better
308
job of allocating and conserving the housing stock.

Even where good cause eviction has stood alone in this country,
without rent control to boost its effect, it has failed miserably. Good
cause eviction schemes in the mobile home context have had near
disastrous results. It might have been anticipated—merely through
the application of basic economic principles—that a good cause eviction regime would do nothing to remedy a supply problem. Indeed,
by discouraging landlord investment in a venture that may quickly
become unprofitable, good cause eviction requirements should have
been expected to increase problems with supply. The market evidence
shows that good cause eviction schemes in mobile home parks have
done precisely that.
Connecticut, one of the earlier states to enact a good cause eviction scheme for mobile home park tenants, has seen, in the wake of
309
the scheme’s adoption, a proliferation of park closings.
And even
beyond supply problems, Connecticut has been forced to confront
rather serious park owner abuses, exceptionally lengthy delays in evic-

305
306
307
308
309

Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 128 n.68.
Id.
Id. at 129 n.73.
SALINS, supra note 152, at xix.
Moukawsher, supra note 295, at 832 n.107.
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tion proceedings, and a general state of increased animosity among
310
landlords and tenants.
Good cause eviction schemes both for ordinary dwellings and in
the mobile home park context, then, have wholly failed to meet their
social and economic goals of protecting tenants by insuring adequate
housing and rectifying social problems. The reality is that they have
decreased both the availability and quality of rental housing.
V. A GROWING NEED TO RESIST THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT
Rules restricting a landlord to evicting a tenant or refusing to
renew his lease for good cause, quite obviously, represent a rather
substantial intrusion upon private property rights. Blackstone defined the essence of the right to property as the “free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminu311
tion, save only by the laws of the land.”
Even at civil law, the right
312
A property
of ownership has been defined as an absolute one.
owner in any legal system “has an inherent right to control the dispo313
sition of her property as she sees fit.” Indeed, most agree that there
314
is no concept of ownership divorced from rights of use and abuse.
Certainly any landowner that enters into a lease is voluntarily restricting his own right of dominion over his land. But that intrusion
upon the rights of the landlord should go only as far as his lease
agreement has permitted. Lease has always been regarded as a tem315
When the period for which a landlord consented to
porary right.
restriction of his use has ended, the landlord’s right to retake the
property is generally considered unfailing. The state should not be
able to change this result without the landowner’s consent, as the
right to enjoy property and to be free from governmental intrusion
316
“is the essence of liberty.”
Good cause eviction requirements intrude upon the province of
the landlord in such a fundamental way that they can only be said to
310

Id. at 831–32.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. Blackstone refused to accept intrusion upon private owners’ rights to achieve social goals. “So great, moreover, is
the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation
of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.” Id.
312
The essence of property at civil law is that “it is exclusive, that is to say, it consists in the attribution of a thing that to a given person is to the exclusion of all others.” PLANIOL, supra note 149, at 378.
313
Salzberg & Zibelman, supra note 15, at 62.
314
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 165 (1921) (McKenna, J., dissenting).
315
Id.
316
Id.
311
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317

alter the very notion of what it means to hold property.
“[T]he
‘sticks in the bundle of rights’ that compose the property interest in a
leasehold have been reallocated between landlord and tenant” to
318
This redistribution is signifiachieve social and economic goals.
cant—it deprives the landlord of some of his most basic rights, in effect, converting a term tenancy he perfected into something more
akin to a life estate, terminable at will by the tenant but lasting in
319
near perpetuity for the landlord. There simply is no theoretical justification for such a subversion of a property owner’s rights. The oftproffered justification that “tenants are more numerous than landlords and that in some way this disproportion . . . makes a tyranny in
320
the landlord” simply does not withstand critical scrutiny.
What is perhaps most disturbing about the proliferation of good
cause eviction requirements is that they seem to utterly fail at meeting their intended goals. Economically, the schemes are not beneficial. In the long term, they certainly do not serve to increase rental
housing supply, which is ironic given that this is the principal reason
321
offered for their promulgation.
Indeed, evidence from Sweden,
and even closer to home in Connecticut, shows that good cause eviction requirements tend to decrease the rental housing stock. Moreover, good cause eviction requirements do not appear to make any
headway in promoting the social goal of decent housing for every individual. To the contrary, they serve to lessen the quality of rental
housing, while simultaneously diminishing its quantity.
The failure of good cause eviction schemes to even begin to
remedy housing problems in Europe and in their limited domain in
the United States just underscores the importance of the recognition
in this country that good cause eviction must not be further imported. There is no reason to believe that a scheme which has not
worked abroad, and has not worked either alone or in combination
with rent control here, will prove useful.
Protection of the social right to housing is important, and to
some extent, the rights of individuals in private property will simply
have to suffer. With a homelessness crisis that has by now touched
317

This modification to the lease relationship has been described as one “contrary
to every conception of leases that the world has ever entertained, and of the reciprocal rights and obligations of lessor and lessee.” Id. at 159.
318
Glendon, supra note 303, at 544.
319
Id. at 543.
320
Block, 256 U.S. at 161 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
321
“Generally speaking, from a comprehensive perspective, it is the long-term, efficient functioning of the sector as a whole that is the prime objective of policy.”
ANGEL, supra note 143, at 295.
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322

most parts of the world, it is clear that something must be done.
Governments must aid in insuring their populations the safest and
best housing possible. But the dream of Les Enfants de Don Quichotte is
indeed an impossible one if it is to be remedied through good cause
eviction schemes. They are simply not a suitable means of achieving
that goal.
The recent spread of the view of housing as a fundamental right
in Europe cannot help but further permeate American law and society. At least nine countries now recognize the availability of decent
323
housing as a basic human right. And already, this movement is tak324
As recently as 2002, voters in Oakland,
ing hold in this country.
California approved a scheme of good cause eviction with a view to
protecting the “human right” to “safe, decent, and sanitary hous325
ing.” The United States government has likewise detailed the social
objective of “ensuring ‘a decent home for every family at a price
326
within their means.’” In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the
State of Louisiana offered incentives to small landlords for repairing
storm-damaged rental housing in an effort to provide affordable
327
The view of the right to
rental housing to low income families.
adequate and affordable housing as one which society must ensure to
328
all, then, is stronger than ever in the United States.
The danger here is that we fall into the trap of believing that
good cause eviction requirements can help us protect this right and
to meet our social goals on housing. As we come closer in the United
States to accepting the burgeoning international social policy on the
right to housing, the question becomes whether we can possibly stave
off the flawed international solution to the housing problem. I argue
that we must, or face the fate of our foreign counterparts that have
tried good cause eviction schemes and failed on both economic and
social fronts. The intrusion of the scheme must be stopped, lest it
damage the American housing situation more.
322

See HUGHES, supra note 157, at 398.
See supra note 11.
324
See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating, Commentary on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1989) (discussing Epstein, supra
note 144).
325
Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22.300 (2003).
326
ANGEL, supra note 143, at 15.
327
Press Release, Louisiana Recovery Authority, LRA Explains Occupancy Rules
for Small Rental Property Program: Landlords Warned Against Evicting Tenants in
Order to Apply for Program (March 13, 2007), available at http://www.lra.louis
iana.gov/pr031307rental.html.
328
See Berger, supra note 5, at 324–25 (proposing that the United States “guarantee” basic housing to all individuals).
323

